The local politics of Global Jihad: A study on the evolution of militant Islamism in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilwe. by Sogge, Erling Lorentzen
The local politics of Global Jihad
A study on the evolution of militant Islamism in the Palestinian refugee  
camp of Ain al-Hilwe
Erling Lorentzen Sogge
   
MØNA 4592
Master's thesis in Middle Eastern studies
30 credits
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages,
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Spring semester, 2014
Abstract
Can Jihadists become pragmatics? In Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilwe, located in Southern 
Lebanon, the Jihadi-Salafi militia Usbat al-Ansar has a long history of catering to the needs of the 
local refugee population. Integrated into the political system of the camp, the group shares the 
responsibility for what is now close to 90,000 refugees, as people at the time of writing keep 
pouring in from a war-stricken Syria. While Usbat al-Ansar might best be known for a wave of 
terrorism and assassinations launched against both Palestinian leaders and Lebanese officials during 
the 90s, the group has in recent years chosen a different pattern of behavior. Whereas Usbat al-
Ansar still commits to the principle of readying the world for the emergence of a global caliphate 
through armed jihad, it now participates in a Unified Political Leadership of the Palestinian factions 
that administer Lebanon's twelve refugee camps. How should we understand this development? 
The aim of this thesis is to further explore the meaning of Usbat al-Ansar 's venture into national 
Palestinian politics in Lebanon. Have the Palestinian mainstream movements been able to contain 
the radical Jihadi-Salafis, or should we understand this formation as a sign of clandestine extremist 
groups gaining ever more ground in the Palestinian community in Lebanon? I pursue the hypothesis 
that Usbat al-Ansar has developed from being a clandestine militia, into becoming a significant 
political and military force in their native camp. This study shows that the group is an integral part 
of the Islamic Forces, a political constellation which controls a significant part of Ain al-Hilwe. 
Inviting the Islamic Forces into national Palestinian politics has been a way for the mainstream 
Palestinian movements to ensure their continued stake in what is the country's biggest and most 
important refugee camp. Ironically, we will see that the Jihadi-Salafis of Usbat al-Ansar have 
become one of the most efficient forces when it comes to warding off the present-day volatile, 
clandestine militias the camp society still suffers at the hands of. 
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Notes on Arabic transliterations
I loosely base my transliterations on the guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 1. 
Citations in Arabic will be written in both Colloquial Arabic and Formal Arabic depending on the 
source. Although one in Levantine Arabic most often replaces the letter qāf  [q] with a glottal stop, 
the hamza ['], or in some dialects gāf [g], I will in all cases use the letter q for clarity. For the sake 
of simplicity my transliterations of formal Arabic will exclude modes and cases. 
When typing out names of lesser known groups, organizations or places I will display these fully 
transcribed and translated in the notes the first time they appear. I will not transcribe people's 
names, but rather use the spelling most commonly used in the Lebanese English language press. All 
transliterations and translations of Arabic or Norwegian are mine. 
1  “IJMES Transliteration system for Arabic, Persian and Turkish,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, last 
modified April, 2014, accessed May, 8. 2014,  http://ijmes.ws.gc.cuny.edu/files/2014/04/TransChart.pdf
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Abbreviations and Arabic glossary
DFLP                        Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Fedā'ī (pl.Fedā'īīn)  A combatant. The term sometimes refers to the PLO combatants who  
                                 “sacrificed” themselves while throwing themselves at Israeli tanks during the 
                                 1968 battle of Karāme in Jordan.
ḥaqq al-ʿawda          The right of return
ICRC                        International Committee of the Red cross
ʿIlm                           Knowledge. For scholars of Islam,ʿilm is a scientific approach to extracting the 
                                  knowledge of the Islamic sources
LAF                          The Lebanese Armed Forces, i.e. the Lebanese army
MB                            The Muslim Brotherhood 
al-Nakba                   The disaster. The word is commonly refers the expulsion of the 
                                  Palestinians during the creation of the state of Israel in 1948
PFLP                         Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP – GC               Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command
PLO                          The Palestinian Liberation Organization
PRS                           Palestinian Refugee(s) from Syria
PRL                           Palestinian Refugee(s) from Lebanon
Shūra                        The Islamic principle of consultation. Sometimes referred to as an alternative 
                                  to democracy
Tawṭīn                       Naturalization, the act of making someone a citizen
UNHCR                    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA                    United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
                                   East
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Introduction
According to Thomas Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at The Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment, events following the outbreak of the «Arab Spring» have shaken our 
understanding of militant Islamism 1. This has particularly been evident in the battlefield of the 
ongoing Syrian war, he argues, where al-Qaida affiliated groups have shown an unexpected amount 
of pragmatism and adaptability. As these groups gain ground, they are posed with new challenges 
and adapt accordingly: Is this the first time we have seen al-Qaida-affiliated militias pass out 
medicines and food among people in need? 2 Looking at Palestinian Jihadist groups in Lebanon, one 
might wonder why our perspective hasn't been challenged earlier.
   In the Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilwe, 3 located in Southern Lebanon, the Jihadi-Salafi 
militia Usbat al-Ansar 4 has a long history of catering to the needs of the local refugee population. 
Integrated into the political system of the camp the group shares the responsibility for what is now 
close to 90,000 refugees, as people keep pouring in from the war-stricken neighboring country. 
While Usbat al-Ansar might best be known for a wave of terrorism and assassinations launched 
against both Palestinian leaders and Lebanese officials during the 90s, the group has in recent years 
chosen a different pattern of behavior. After the Jihadist militia Fatah al-Islam 5 engaged in a long 
drag-out battle against the Lebanese Armed Forces in 2007, an event which displaced nearly 30,000 
Palestinian refugees and completely destroyed the northern Nahr al-Barid camp, Usbat al-Ansar 
issued a fatwa condemning any attacks on Lebanese soldiers 6. 
   In the wake of the crisis at Nahr al-Barid the International Crisis Group advised the Palestinian 
factions to “create a single representative body” to serve as a unified interlocutor in their dialogue 
with Lebanese authorities 7. As of 2013 this unified Palestinian body is a reality. The project, 
1   Thomas Hegghammer “Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring,” Middle East Political Science,  
     (2014):  http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/jihadism-seven-assumptions-shaken-by-the-arab-spring/ 
2 cf. The Washington Post, «Rival al-Qaeda-linked groups fortifying in Syria with mix of pragmatism and militancy,» 
October 13. 2013:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-  qaeda-linked-groups-taking-root-in-  
syria/2013/10/13/11d01b12-334c-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html
3    ʿAin al-ḥilwe (The sweet spring)
4    ʿUṣbat al-anṣār al-islāmiyya  (The Islamic League of Partisans)
5    Fataḥ al-islām (The Islamic Conquest)
6    The Daily Star, “Osbat al-Ansar issues fatwa outlawing fighting with LAF,”  December 6. 2008:
      http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Dec-06/56796-osbat-al-ansar-issues-fatwa-outlawing-
     fighting-with-laf.ashx#axzz2uGSpq7Zz 
7 International Crisis Group, “Lebanon's Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle over Nahr al-Bared,” Middle East  
Report, no. 117 (2012): http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-
lebanon/lebanon/117-lebanons-palestinian-dilemma-the-struggle-over-nahr-al-bared.aspx
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spearheaded by Hamas, came at a point when the factions were at loggerheads over the Syrian crisis 
and must perhaps be seen as an attempt to contain the mounting political tension. Interestingly this 
body includes some of the Jihadist movements from Ain al-Hilwe that earlier were thought to pose 
the biggest threat to stability in the camp. 
   After completing a field study in Ain al-Hilwe in the early 2000s, political scientist Bernard 
Rougier warned that Usbat al-Ansar was taking part in a “warlike cult of jihad” he saw emerging in 
the camp; one that through its violence had been able to reduce the influence of the “Palestinian 
national movement” to the extent where one no longer could “speak of a Palestinian society in 
Lebanon's camps”8. Rougier's work has become a benchmark study in analyzing the emergence 
militant Islamist groups in the refugee camps of Lebanon, but recent events suggest that the 
dynamics of Palestinian Islamism in said country might be changing.
   Whereas Usbat al-Ansar still commits to the principles of militant jihad and the struggle for a 
global caliphate 9, it now takes part in national Palestinian politics in Lebanon, where it routinely 
meets the PLO and the other factions at the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut. How should we 
understand this development?
Research question
The aim of this study is to further explore the meaning of Usbat al-Ansar 's venture into national 
Palestinian politics in Lebanon. My research question is as follows: Is the inclusion of Usbat al-
Ansar in the Unified Political Leadership of the Palestinian factions a result of the mainstream 
Palestinian movements having been able to contain the threat of Jihadi-Salafism and its most 
significant proponents in the camps, or should we understand this formation as a sign of clandestine 
extremist groups gaining ever more ground in the Palestinian community in Lebanon?
   In order to seek an answer to this question I pose the hypothesis that Usbat al-Ansar has 
developed from being a violent, clandestine militia, into becoming a significant political and 
military force in their native camp. This study shows that the group is an integral part of the Islamic 
Forces, a political constellation which controls a significant part of Ain al-Hilwe. Unable to 
compete with their military force, the mainstream Palestinian movements have reluctantly accepted 
Usbat al-Ansar as a party they need to cooperate with.
8    Bernard Rougier, Everyday jihad: The rise of militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, Trans. Pascale 
      Ghazale (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2, 3.
9 Burhan Yasin,“ʿUṣbat al-anṣār minʿiṣāba 'ilā ʿaāmil 'istiqrār fī lubnān (Usbat al-Ansar: From an armed gang to an 
agent of stability in Lebanon”,) Saidadays.com, May 4. 2013:
     http://saidadays.com/news.php?go=fullnews&newsid=15834
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The structure of the study
In the first chapter I will give an overview of previous studies done on Islamism in the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Lebanon, before I situate this thesis within a theoretical framework.
   In chapter two I will present the methodological approach which forms the foundation of this 
study, and discuss ethical implications.
   In chapter three I delve into the security zones of Ain al-Hilwe where I present an updated 
political map of the camp. Although it is the base of the Islamic Forces, I contest the hypothesis that 
Ain al-Hilwe is a breeding ground for Jihadism. I maintain that it rather should be seen as a 
contested ground, where a myriad of movements are vying for influence.
   The fourth chapter seeks to improve our understanding of the ideology of Usbat al-Ansar, as it 
follows their evolution from Teheran-backed resistance militia, into a global Jihadist movement. In 
this chapter we are introduced to volatile Jihadi-Salafi groups such as Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-
Sham, where I argue that Usbat al-Ansar has developed in a different direction.
   In chapter five I present the circumstances surrounding the creation of a Unified Political 
Leadership and seek to understand why the Islamic Forces of Ain al-Hilwe have been included in 
this project. Further, I explore how clandestine militias are confronted by the mainstream 
Palestinian movements. 
  The sixth and final chapter concludes the study and provides a summary of its main findings. 
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1 Theoretical framework
In this chapter I will give a brief overview of the situation of the Palestinian camp dwellers in 
Lebanon, and look at how the notion of Islamism in the camp societies have been dealt with in 
previous studies. 
   The precarious situation of the refugees in Lebanon
The Palestinian's history in Lebanon predominantly dates back to the creation of the State of Israel 
in 1948 when waves of refugees fleeing from acts of war in Northern Galilee, mainly hailing from 
the cities Akka, Haifa, Jaffa, og Safed, were driven across the Lebanese border. Although the 
refugees originally constituted roughly 100.000 individuals, it's hard to give an accurate estimate of 
their numbers nearly four generations later. Using UNRWA's estimates from November 2013 as a 
starting point, we can assume that 270.000 Palestinian refugees currently reside in Lebanon 10. 
However, this figure excludes Palestinians who have settled down in Lebanon since violence broke 
out in the al-Yarmouk area in Damascus in late 2012; at the time of writing they account for nearly 
50.000 individuals 11.
   Like in most Arabic states, Palestinians in Lebanon are legally not able to apply for citizenship. 
Roberts claims the stately aversion to naturalizing the refugees is connected to their religion 12. In a 
country where political power is allocated based on a denominational system, the mainly Sunni 
Palestinians threaten a delicate sectarian power balance. The aversion to tawṭīn, naturalization, is 
ironically shared by the refugees themselves. The right of return [ḥaqq al-ʿawda] is defining for the 
diaspora, and accepting citizenships from their host countries would by many be seen as a betrayal 
of the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian position in Lebanon, as advocated by PLO, has been to 
demand a modicum civil rights as long as they are not able to return to their home country 13 . 
10 UNRWA, “UNRWAS Response and Services to Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon : Bi-weekly 
      briefing November 29. 2013”. Internal report, 2013.
11 According to UNRWA, the number is expected to remain stable as the ongoing violence in al-Yarmok, and other 
areas in and around the Syrian capital where the vast majority of PRS in Lebanon fled from, persists. This figure 
suggests a 19% increase in the Palestinian population of Lebanon. As is the case with the original refugee 
population, around 50% of the displaced PRS reside in Lebanon's twelve official Palestinian refugee camps. The 
area taking in the most PRS percentage wise has been the eastern al-Jalil camp along with a number of informal 
gatherings along the Syrian border, while the largest actual number of refugees have settled down in Ain al-Hilwe in 
the outskirts of the southern city Saida, forcing its previously assumed population of 70.000 to rise to well over a 
90.000 (UNRWA numbers are based on the author's interview with Firas Abo Aloul, Area Communication Officer 
for UNRWA in Central Lebanon,  Beirut January 2014)
12 Rebecca, Roberts Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement (I.B. Tauris, 2010), 70
13  Souheil al-Natour, “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies issue 10, no. 3 (1997): 
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Lebanese authorities have for their part maintained that giving the refugees civil rights that they 
demand, would be a pretext for a gradual integration into society, and is therefore unwanted. After 
66 years of exile, the refugees are still legally treated as “stateless foreigners” 14.
   Practically speaking this means that Palestinians in Lebanon are met with a myriad of restrictions 
which systematically prevent them from building a future in the country. They cannot own land or 
property, and much less pass it down to their children – inheritance is forbidden 15. Further, they 
cannot work within the public sector and are legally prevented from at least 25 occupations that 
require memberships in Lebanese syndicates 16. While labor rights for Palestinians have been 
slightly amended in recent years, the fact remains that 56%  of the camp dwellers are still 
unemployed, and those who have jobs are for the most part doing unskilled labor with little job 
security 17. As for the Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, 90% of are unemployed 18. 
Living under harsh legal and social conditions, the Palestinians in Lebanon are more subject to 
abject poverty and are in more need of humanitarian support than in any other part of the diaspora 19 
.
   Previous studies
It is particularly the precarious situation of the camp dwellers that continuous to be the field of 
study for scholars researching the Palestinians of Lebanon. The violence that the camps experienced 
during the Lebanese civil war (1975 – 1990), and the isolation and social misery the refugees would 
come to experience in the post-war republic, has been dealt with in a wide array of studies. 
War, memory and civil rights
Studies like al-Hout's recollection of the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 1982, 20 and Sayegh's “Too 
      doi:10.1093/jrs/10.3.360 
14 Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi “Introduction,” in Palestinian Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the Levant, ed. 
Knudsen and Hanafi (London: Routledge, 2011), 2
15 Amnesty International, “Lebanon: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Ninth session of the 
      UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, November-December 2010, Amnesty report, (2011):
       http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE18/002/2010/en/fed33a5a-22ec-4237-9743-
      d5ae5896acda/mde180022010en.html%20%2801.11.2013%29 
16 BBC, “Lebanon grants Palestinian refugees right to work,” August 17. 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11004945
17 UNRWA ,“Palestine refugees: A special case,” unrwa.org, 2011:
      http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20111002306.pdf
18 ANERA, “Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon: A needs assessment,”ANERA report (2013):
      http://www.anera.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/PalestinianRefugeesFromSyriainLebanon.pdf
19 Åge A. Tiltnes, “Falling behind: A brief on the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,” FAFO report  
464 (2005):  http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/464/464.pdf
20  Al-Hout, Bayan Nuwayhed Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, (London: Pluto press, 2004)
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many enemies” 21, covering the camp wars in Beirut (1985 - 1987), do an excellent job in retracing 
oral testaments of traumatizing events that have been defining for the diaspora in Lebanon. 
Haugbolle 22 also touches on the camps, and particularly the role played by PLO, when exploring 
Lebanese recollections of the Civil War. Political scientist Brynen has written extensively on the 
expulsion of the PLO 23 while al-Natour 24 and Roberts 25 focus more explicitly on the refugee's lack 
of civil rights as a consequence of not being included in the post-war state. The latter gives an 
interesting account of the survival strategies of the camp dwellers, given their current status as 
stateless persons. Peteet 26 deals with modes of coping in an anthropological perspective, as she 
explores how social systems from Palestine are being reproduced in the Lebanese camps because of 
their detachment from Lebanese society.
Governance
More recently we have seen a series of studies focusing less on memories and identity, but rather 
look at the systems of governance found in the refugee camps. The most prolific scholar taking on 
this perspective is Sari Hanafi, a sociologist based at the American University of Beirut. Seeing that 
Lebanon no longer treats the PLO as a sole representative for the refugees, Hanafi contends that the 
state prevents the Palestinians from “establishing effective governance structures” 27,  rendering the 
camps “laboratories” 28 where a wide array of modes of governance compete with each other, thus 
creating an environment of “Rampant factionalism, clientelism, sectarian strife, oppressive 
Lebanese security and surveillance” 29. 
  Inspired by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, Hanafi describes the camps in Lebanon as 
“spaces of exception” 30. Whereas Agamben 31 originally uses the term ”states of exception” to 
21 Sayegh, Rosemary  Too many enemies. London: Zed Books, 1994
22 Haugbolle, Sune, War and Memory in Lebanon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
23 Brynen, Rex, “The politics of exile: The Palestinians in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, (1990): 
http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/3/204.full.pdf ; Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon.  
(Westview Press, 1999)
24 Souheil al-Natour, “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (1997): 
360-377 doi:10.1093/jrs/10.3.360 
25  Roberts, Palestinians in Lebanon
26 Peteet, Julie, Landscape of hope and despair: Palestinian refugee camps. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005)
27 Sari Hanafi and Taylor Long. “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian
      Refugee Camps of Lebanon” in Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2010): 2,
      http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/2/134.abstract
28 Sari Hanafi, “Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon As a Space of Exception” REVUE Asylon(s), no. 5, (2008); 
http://www.reseau-terra.eu/article798.html 
29 Hanafi and Long, “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian
      Refugee Camps of Lebanon,” 2
30 Hanafi and Long, “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian
      Refugee Camps of Lebanon” 
31 Agamben, G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Heller-Roazen, (Standford University Press, 1998)
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describe a repressive suspension of law enacted by European governments during during the first 
and second world wars, Hanafi finds that Palestinian refugee camps in post-war Lebanon exist in a 
constant state of law being suspended: A lack of proper internal governance is explained by pointing 
at the external state-sanctioned repression of the camp societies. This outside-in narrative is to a 
high degree also present in studies dealing with the surge of Islamism in the Palestinian 
communities of Lebanon.
Islamism in the camps
Hanafi and Long believe the ”rise and spread of Islamism” 32 in the camps to be one of several 
consequences of Lebanese authorities' delegitimisation of the PLO. It is here understood that 
Islamism, as a social force, has found its footing in the camps in the absence of a strong Palestinian 
authority, which is prevented by the Lebanese state. Where Hanafi and Long underline the 
significant position the Islamist nationalists of Hamas have been able to assume, as a result of a 
weakened PLO, the the smaller, violent and clandestine networks have attracted far more scholarly 
attention.
   Knudsen 33, Suleiman 34 and Hamzeh 35 each give detailed and interesting accounts of how both 
Islamist Palestinian factions and smaller militant networks of Jihadists came to be an emerging 
force in the camps from the early 90s and onwards. Gade's study on Fatah al-Islam and the Nahr al-
Barid crisis is equally informative 36, while Rosen places the Lebanon-based Jihadi-Salafis in a 
broader regional context 37. Further, Pall's study on Lebanese Salafism, mainly concentrating his 
searchlight outside of the camps, provide us with interesting points for reference 38. 
   The French Political Scientist Bernard Rougier 39 is, however, quite unique in devoting an entire 
book to describing the Palesinian Jihadist militants challenging the PLO and its leading faction, 
Fatah, for their hegemony in Ain al-Hilwe. In his seminal work Everyday Jihad, the author believes 
32 Hanafi and Long, “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian
      Refugee Camps of Lebanon,” 2
33 Are Knudsen, “Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 
18, no. 2 (2005): http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/2/216.abstract?sid=312ca606-8ad8-4748-9f5e-
05729288beae 
34 Suleiman, Jaber, “The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of 
Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 29, no.1 (1999): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676432
35 Nizar A. Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide to the Groups” Middle Eastern Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3 (1997):
      http://www.meforum.org/362/islamism-in-lebanon-a-guide-to-the-groups
36 Gade, Tine, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon: Between global and local jihad, Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) , report FFI- 2007/02727 (2007): http://www.ffi.no/no/rapporter/07-02727.pdf
37 Nir Rosen,  Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World, (New York: Nation Books,  
     2010)
38 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe: Development, Fractionalization and Transnational  
Networks of Salafism in Lebanon, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013)
39  Rougier, Everyday jihad
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a “warlike cult of jihad” 40 to be on the rise in the camp: A threat, we learn, that is likely to spread 
also to other camps – maybe even to the Palestinian territories 41. The prominence and relative 
celebrity of groups like Usbat al-Ansar, a militia more preoccupied with the global Jihadist scene 
than the traditional struggle against Israel, is explained by pointing to the social misery felt by Ain 
al-Hilwe-youth in the post-war republic, and, again, by the PLO's dwindling influence. Where the 
PLO is unable to unite the refugees under a national banner, extremist movements rise to power. 
   
A different angle
In his monograph on the Islamic movements in the camps of Lebanon, Ra'fat Morra 42
provides an extensive and detailed historical trajectory of Palestinian Islamism in Lebanon that 
might have slipped under the international radar due to the book only being available in Arabic 
language. Being a Hamas official himself, Morra's account of his own movement's legacy in 
Lebanon is at times biased, nonetheless, as an insider he provides an insightful study that stands in 
contrast to some of the aforementioned works. Where he puts emphasis on the evolution of the 
continuously changing political and religious landscape of the camps from the 80s until recent 
years, an extremist takeover is not what he sees as the emerging trend: Morra portrays a broader 
Islamic alliance consisting of anything from Jihadi-Salafi militias, quietist movements, to 
nationalistic resistance groups, and other seemingly unlikely partners. 
   While much attention has been given to the many Jihadist militias based in and around the Ain al-
Hilwe camp, scholars have perhaps overlooked the fact that some of these, since the early 90s, have 
been a part of the camp's internal political administration. The Palestinian factions commonly draw 
a clear line between the groups that are inside or outside what is referred to as the Islamic Forces of 
Ain al-Hilwe; a broad political alliance that takes part in running the camp. This division provides 
us with an interesting starting point for further exploring the dynamics of Jihadism in the 
Palestinian community in Lebanon.
   Firewalls and Conveyor-belts: A typology
In his discussion on the Muslim Brotherhood, Marc Lynch 43 seeks to understand the relationship 
40 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 2
41 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 278
42  Ra'fat Fahd Morra, Al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya fī-l-mujtamʾa al-filasṭīnī  fī lubnān: al-nish'ā – al-'ahdāf – 
     al-'injāzāt.[The Islamic  Forces and Movements in the Palestinian Community in Lebanon] (Beirut: al-Zaytouna 
    Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2010)
43 Mark Lynch, “Islam divided between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 33, no. 6, 
(2010): doi: 10.1080 / 10576101003752622 
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between the movement and smaller radical networks operating within the Jihadi-Salafi realm. Does 
the Brotherhood work as a “firewall” against the violent groups by capturing Islamists within a 
relatively moderate organization and stopping their further radicalization, or is it rather a 
“conveyor-belt” for the extremist groups, seeing that their “non-violent extremism [sic]” 44 might 
only be one stage on the road to radicalization? While Lynch directs these questions at the US 
foreign service as he urges his readers to distinguish between the MB and al-Qaida, this model 
might also be useful in analyzing the role of the Islamic Forces and Usbat al-Ansar. As a working 
hypothesis I suggest that we see three mobilizing fronts in Palestinian Islamism as represented in 
the camps of Lebanon 45:
1) Nationalist resistance movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who trace their origins back 
to Palestine, 2) The local Lebanese brand of Palestinian Islamism as represented by the Islamic 
Forces of Ain al-Hilwe, 3) and clandestine, militant Jihadist networks operating outside of 
Palestinian factionalism, which mainly are found in and around Ain al-Hilwe. 
Whereas the Lebanese branches of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are pragmatic movements which have 
a history of cooperating with a wide array of organizations, ranging from socialist and communist 
Palestinian groups, to the Shiite-Islamists of Hizballah, where should we place the Islamic Forces? 
As we will see in chapters to come, this political alliance consists of movements that potentially 
could fit under both category 1 and 3. A focal point in this study will be to determine whether the 
Islamic Forces should be understood as a firewall against the extremist militias, or a conveyor-belt 
for their radicalism. 
   Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the precarious situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 
shown the ways it has been dealt with in a vast array of studies. We have paid close attention to 
studies of both governance and Islamism in the camps, as these are often interrelated. A main 
hypothesis shared by many scholars is that the removal of the PLO as a central authority in the 
camps in the early 80s, has paved the way for other movements to gain a footing. Whereas the 
44 Lynch ,“Islam divided between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan”
45 The camps of Lebanon also host a number of Palestinian and Lebanese quietist Islamist movements who 
predominantly stay out of politics. I have chosen not to focus on them in this thesis, as we are specifically 
addressing movements engaged in what can be interpreted as a struggle for political and territorial ground. It would 
be naïve to assume that the quietist movements don't participate in this struggle to a certain degree, but they are not 
a driving force.
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clandestine militants of Ain al-Hilwe continue to be the center of attention of many scholarly 
studies, they don't necessarily constitute the driving force among the Islamist factions competing 
with a weakened present-day PLO in Lebanon. In chapters to come we will look closer at the 
political system of Ain al-Hilwe, and try to determine whether Usbat al-Ansar and the Islamic 
Forces represent a firewall or a conveyor-belt towards the extremist expressions of Islamism found 
in the camp. 
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2 Methodology
   A Field study
This thesis builds on a field study conducted between August 2013 and January 2014 as a part of a 
six month stay in Lebanon. During my stay I worked as a trainee at the Norwegian Embassy in 
Beirut where I completed a thirty page field report of the Shatila camp. In this report I explored the 
ways the Syrian crisis was manifesting itself in the Beirut camp; this particularly pertaining to inter-
factional tension 46. I documented how local Hamas officials feared that their pro-Syrian allies 
would turn on them, as the former were perceived to have sided with the Syrian rebellion against 
president Bashar al-Asad. When discussing these topics with interlocutors from various Palestinian 
factions, the Islamic Forces in Ain al-Hilwe would frequently come up. I took note of how these 
groups and their supporters generally were thought to be the least willing to commit to the 
guidelines of neutrality that the mainstream factions allegedly were following. I also learned that 
the Islamist dissidents from the southern camp also recently had been included in a new Unified 
National Leadership for the Palestinian Factions.
   After concluding my study on Shatila, I continued my conversations with the Palestinian 
leadership in Lebanon inquiring more about this new creation and while exploring views on the 
Islamic Forces. These conversations, 16 in total with 7 different factions,  form the base of this 
study. (See chapter 7 for a list of interviews)
Access and limitations
Being employed at the Norwegian embassy, I was prevented from entering Ain al-Hilwe because of 
my employer's security measures; due to a surge of recent assassinations and clashes the embassy 
deemed the camp too unsafe. Out of respect for my employer's wishes I waited until I had finished 
my business with the embassy to plan a trip to the camp, but was again prevented from going when 
my contacts from a few local NGOs, that earlier had invited me to come see them, no longer were 
willing to accept me. They hinted it would be risky for them to be seen with a foreigner given the 
current climate. In the end I made plans with a delegation from the Fatah movement in Shatila to 
take me, who in turn also backed out when I told them with whom I wished to speak: Mahmoud al-
Lino Issa, The former chief of the PLO's armed forces and the person to possibly survive the largest 
46 The report “Shatila under den syriske krisa (Shatila during the Syrian crisis)” was published internally by the 
Norwegian foreign service in January 2014. 
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number of assassination attempts in the camp, had recently been ousted from the movement on 
allegations of corruption and was now seen as a highly controversial figure. I figured Issa would be 
a good source of information as he is reputed to be the staunchest opponent to the clandestine 
militias in the camp. I acquired his phone number from another source, but Issa himself suggested 
that it would be safer if I sent someone in my place to interview him. I prepared questions and a 
tape recorder for a trusted contact in Shatila who was willing to go in my place. He executed the 
task perfectly, but before he was able to go from Fatah to seek out other factions as planned, heavy 
machine gun fire broke out in the camp and forced him cut his visit short. We agreed we wouldn't 
make a second attempt.
  Why center this study around a camp I wasn't able to enter myself? Usbat al-Ansar and the Islamic 
Forces aren't present in any other place than Ain al-Hilwe, and exploring their role in their local 
context is pivotal in understanding their rise to preeminence in Palestinian factionalism in Lebanon. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for scholars to research groups or places that are unattainable for 
various reasons; we would hardly have any studies on al-Qaida if researching the network only 
could be done through meeting its combatants in their homes. Although the camp itself was out of 
bounds for me, information about what was happening inside of it was not hard to find. As both 
journalists and politicians for better or worse was giving the camp a great deal of attention due to 
the heightened security level in Lebanon, Palestinian officials from any political constellation were 
usually more than willing to meet in order to discuss the situation at their headquarters in Beirut 47. 
   The interviews
Meeting the factions
The first bout of conversations (September – November 2013) mostly dealt with inter-factional 
relations during the Syrian crisis and abilities to overcome social and humanitarian issues in the 
camps and camp security. These were mainly conducted in the framework of the report I was 
writing for the embassy, but many of the conversations proved to be relevant also for this study. The 
second batch of interviews (December 2013 – January 2014), would revolve more specifically 
around the factions' relationship with the Islamic Forces. The interviews were conducted in the 
Shatila, Burj al-Barajne and Mar Elias camps, the latter being the camp where most factions have 
their central headquarters in Lebanon. This excludes Hamas whom I met with at their offices in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut.
47 An exception is the Pro-Syrian faction al-Saaiqa. Despite having made three appointments to meet with them, they 
never showed
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   Although meetings with Ain al-Hilwe-based factions such as Usbat al-Ansar and al-Harika al-
Islamiyya al-Moujahida for practical reasons were not realistic, interviews with these were 
continuously being published in the media, and I would frequently ask other factions to comment on 
the ideas and views presented in these. 
Civilians, NGOs and writers
During my field study I would continuously run into Ain al-Hilwe inhabitants visiting family or 
attending weekend classes in the Beirut camps, who provided me with invaluable perspectives 
concerning life in the camp. Comparing this data with the Beirut camps was especially interesting. 
   Further I met with five authors that have written extensively on the Palestinians in Lebanon in 
various publications: Mohsen Saleh, general director of the think tank al-Zaytouna Centre,  Soheil 
al-Natour, a human rights lawyer and DFLP official located in the Mar Elias camp, Hamas' own 
Ra'fat Morra, journalists Franklin Lamb and Mohammad al-Zaatari, the latter frequently reporting 
from Ain al-Hilwe for the Lebanese daily, the Daily Star. 
   Further, I met with representatives of the following NGOs that work with Palestinian refugees: 
UN's Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Beit Atfal al-Somoud, 
which provides education for Palestinian children, the Popular Aid for Relief and Development, 
which provides aid and healthcare for refugees who live in the adjacent areas of camps such as 
Shatila and Ain al-Hilwe, and The Youth Fraternity, who prepare young refugees for career life.
These meetings proved to be fruitful as I could bounce ideas off professionals who had one foot in 
and one foot outside of the camp societies.
   Although not every source is cited in this thesis, each and every one of these encounters have 
helped broaden my understanding pertaining to the topic of this study.
Language
All but four interviews were conducted in colloquial Arabic. Although not my mother tongue, 
having studied the language intensively for three years prior to this study, half of that time in the 
Arabic world, I had few concerns about conducting the field work in Arabic. It was the language I 
used at home in Beirut, and oftentimes in the workplace, and it felt natural to also use it in the field.
I was at times offered to speak English, but preferred to continue in Arabic, as I had prepared my 
questions in this language. A significant portion of my written sources are also in Arabic, ranging 
from news coverage, documentaries portraying the factions of Ain al-Hilwe, academic works, to 
social media pages connected to the camp in question. These have been important as they have 
provided me with updates, and local context not necessarily found in English language sources. I 
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have taken extra precautions when navigating in the Lebanese media landscape, as most 
publications are funded by political parties, and to some extent reflect their owner's views.
Ethical implications
I would seldom find myself conducting one-to-one interviews. Whether sitting in offices, Popular 
committees, or family homes, my interlocutors and I would often be surrounded by people coming 
and going. These would often lend their comments to the discussions, and sometimes even 
participate eagerly. As it was impossible to provide each and everyone of them with a detailed 
description of my project, to the extent that these are cited in this work, I will not display their 
names. 
   The same goes for civilian camp dwellers. Although these without exception gave their consent to 
having their names disclosed, this was in certain instances quite obviously a product of peer 
pressure from family members or friends who were overzealous in providing me, the researcher, 
with personal details concerning the interviewees. Well aware that this study revolves around 
controversial themes, I decided to anonymize my civilian interlocutors.
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3 A political map of Ain al-Hilwe
In interviews with Fatah officials in the Beirut-camps, I would often be told that the “real 
revolution” takes place in Ain al-Hilwe. 48 “It is the only place where Fatah is still proud” a man 
working for the PLO's National Security Forces in the Burj al-Barajne camp lamented. While Ain 
al-Hilwe by some is seen as a Fatah stronghold, others see it as a base of renegade Jihadist militias, 
and it is in the media commonly depicted as a “Zone of unlaw” 49, a “security island” 50, or a “ 
breeding ground for Islamist militants” 51.  
   Is Ain al-Hilwe a Fatah stronghold or a base for clandestine Jihadists? In this chapter I will delve 
into the security zones of the most conflict-stricken camp in the country as I provide an overview of 
the different movements vying for influence. First off I will give a historical backdrop for 
understanding how the PLO went from ruling the camps of Lebanon, into being expelled, 
fragmented and contested for their hegemony upon their return. 
   The rise and fall of a revolution
Ain al-hilwe, meaning The sweet spring, is also the name of the urban district where the camp is 
seated at the south eastern side of the coastal city Saida, often referred to as Lebanon's southern 
capital. With its renowned vegetable market and cheap housing (accommodating a wide array of 
nationalities like Iraqis, Egyptians Sri Lankans, and working class Lebanese families 52 ) , the camp 
is a vital part of Saida's urban fabric. It is also, paradoxically, the heaviest guarded of the Palestinian 
camps; army checkpoints surround both the the site itself and its adjacent areas. 
   The history of Ain al-Hilwe, is one of power changing hands. What in ancient times allegedly was 
a Phoenician necropolis 53, would come to be one of Lebanon's seven emirates under the Druze 
48  Mahmoud Abu Jaber al-Afifi, Fatah official in Shatila, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
49 Gary C. Gambill, “Ain al-Hilweh: Lebanon's 'Zone of unlaw'”, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol.5, no 6 (2003): 
http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0306_l1.htm
50 NOW News Lebanon, “Fī jazīrat ʿain al-ḥilwe...baqāyā faṣa'il wa ṭalā'iʿa al-qāʿida [In the Island of Ain al-
Hilwe...the remnants of factions and the vanguards of al-Qaida], January 14. 2014: 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/ar/nowspecialar/529999-  ةدعاقلا-عئلطو-لئاصف-اياقب-ةولحلا-نيع-ةريزج-يف  
51 The Christian Science Monitor, “Why Palestinian refugees in Lebanon support violence rather than peace talks”, 
September 27. 2010: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0927/Why-Palestinian-refugees-in-
Lebanon-support-violence-rather-than-peace-talks
52 Rashid al-Mansi. Youtth programme coordinator for P.A.R.D., an NGO that deals with refugees living in adjacent 
areas of the refugee camps Shatila and Ain al-Hilwe, interview with author, Beirut, September 2013
53  Marwan Ghandour, “Who is 'Ain al-Hilweh?,” Jadaliyya.com, September 30. 2013:
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14379/who-is-%E2%80%98ain-al-hilweh 
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prince Fakhr-al-Din Ibn Maan of the Maan dynasty during the Ottoman period. The site itself was a 
military camp during the French rule of Lebanon (1918 – 1943), and it's remains were used to 
construct a refugee camp shortly after al-Nakba, the catastrophe, struck in 1948. Just like the eleven 
other present-day Palestinian camps, Ain al-Hilwe started as an informal cluster of displaced 
refugees who found themselves unable to return to their home villages of northern Palestine after 
the creation of the state of Israel on May 15. 1948. Neither the refugees nor Lebanese authorities 
expected the displacement to last: According to writer Leila Abu Saba, her grandparents and other 
Saida landowners were first requested by the state to lend their property to the refugees for only two 
weeks, until they later started collecting a symbolic sum for the land 54. While the tent landscapes 
set up by the ICRC rapidly grew, the refugees continued to live under sparse conditions. In the 
beginning materials like nails and cement were in the eyes of the state equated with “continuity” 
and therefore strictly forbidden 55. Matters improved slightly as UNRWA began operating in the 
camp in 1952 and gradually replaced its canvas tents with concrete shelters, but the faith of the 
refugees wouldn't turn until Yaser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) set up 
their offices in Lebanon in the late 60s. 
Days of revolution  (Ayyām al-thawra)
If the Nakba of '48 hadn't already, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem following 
the six day war of 1967 certainly resulted in a strong politicization of the diaspora. It also led to a 
significant growth in support for the Palestinian cause throughout the Arabic world. In Lebanon this 
cause was adopted by a broader leftist opposition movement that sought to challenge the mainly 
christian nationalist elite 56. When the PLO was forced to resettle from Jordan to Lebanon  in the 
wake of Black September, the Lebanese public was seemingly overwhelming in its welcome: 46% 
were in full support of the PLO's right to wage a war on Israel from Lebanese soil, and 40% gave 
their reserved support 57. A weakened Lebanese government buckling under pan-Arabic leftist 
pressure saw no other solution than to sign the renowned Cairo Accords of 1969, thereby formally 
allowing the PLO to continue with their “Palestinian revolution” against Israel from the refugee 
camps, albeit under supervision of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 58. 
   For most camp dwellers, this meant a dramatic improvement of their livelihoods. The PLO, 
54  Leila Abu Saba, “Americans who wonder ‘why they hate us?’ should consider Ain al Hilweh in Lebanon”,      
      Mondoweiss, February 3. 2009: http://mondoweiss.net/2009/02/leila-abu-saba-writesthe-post-on-this-site-
     yesterday-  that- mentioned-the-destruction-of-the-palestinian-refugee-camp-at-ain-a.html  
55 Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, (London: Pluto press, 2004)
56 Haugbolle, War and memory, 30 – 40 
57 Brynen “The politics of exile” 
58 Brynen, Sanctuary and survival
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backed by petrodollars from the gulf states, introduced social, educational and health services to the 
camp societies, and employed as much as half of the Palestinian workforce themselves 59 . What is 
often referred to the most prosperous period for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 60 would come 
to an abrupt end as the PLO came under heavy fire with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war 
(1975 – 90).
The death of the revolution
Through its continuous attacks on Israel carried out from the southern refugee camps, the PLO 
made powerful enemies in the process. Israel, Syria, and the Lebanese christian nationalist al-
Katā'ib party (The Phalange), all took turns at trying to end the Palestinian revolution. While the 
PLO were subject to crippling military defeats in the camps, their political support also plummeted 
as Israel responded to their aggression and invaded Lebanon both in 1978 and 1982, laying waste to 
much of the country's infrastructure and killing thousands of civilians in the process 61. In the wake 
of the latter invasion, American diplomats brokered a deal with the Lebanese government to let the 
PLO evacuate the country peacefully, while providing guarantees that the camps wouldn't be 
attacked in their absence 62. Ariel Sharon still believed the Palestinians to be hiding no less than 
2000 armed PLO-combatants in the capital, and Israeli forces surrounded the Beirut-camps 63. In the 
middle of September 1982 a militia connected to the al-Katā'ib-party was able to enter and kill what 
is estimated to be at least 1700 civilians in the Shatila-camp and its adjacent neighborhood Sabra 64 
65. Arafat, having relocated to Tunis, would come under fire from his own shortly after. As the 
Lebanese army was inching closer to a complete collapse and splinter into various factions, and 
59 Franklin Lamb, independent journalist based in Beirut, interview with the author, Beirut, November 2013
60 Roberts, Palestinians in Lebanon
61 According to Lebanese daily al-Nahar, Lebanese officials estimate that roughly 19.000 people died during the 1982 
invasion. Of the alleged 6, 700 casualties in the Beirut area, 84% were thought to be civilians. These numbers do not 
include the Sabra and Shatila massacre. al-Nahar cited by National Emergency Committee on Lebanon.”The 1982 
Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: the Casualties,” Race & Class, vol. 24, no. 4. (Spring 1983): 340-342. 
http://rac.sagepub.com/content/24/4/327.full.pdf+html
62 Manal Kortam, “Politics, Patronage and Popular Committees in the Shatila Refugee Camp, Lebanon”, Palestinian 
Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the Levant, ed. Knudsen and Hanafi, (London: Routledge, 2011)
63 Sayigh, Too many enemies
64 Al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila
65 The southern camps also suffered great losses. In Burj al-Shamli the renowned al-Ḥūlī kindergarten was destroyed 
by phosphorous bombs dropped from Israeli war planes, resulting in the death of nearly a hundred children. What 
remained of Ain al-Hilwe after the bomb raids, was bulldozed to pieces after Israeli soldiers passed through the 
southern parts of the country on their way to Beirut. According to UNRWA's estimates 57% of homes in the eight 
refugee camps in the Beirut, Saida and Sor areas were destroyed, with another 36% damaged in aerial bombardment, 
ground fighting, and subsequent bulldozing, following Israel’s invasion of 1982. The vast scale of the damage 
affected some 73,500 refugees  in the aforementioned areas. 
See Kalache and Christoff “Radio Documentary - Burj el-Shemali Refugee Camp”, June 16. 2006:
http://rabble.ca/podcasts/shows/radio-tadamon/radio-documentary-burj-el-shemali-refugee-camp;
      Badil,Overview of Secondary Displacement of Palestinians in and from Host Countries, Badil.org,  2010:
     http://www.badil.org/es/monitoreo-continuo-de-los-desplazamientos/item/1363-overview-of-secondary-
displacement-of-palestinians-in-and-from-host-countries
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Israel was gradually pulling out of the war, the fate of both the Lebanese and the Palestinian people 
came to rely more and more on the Syrian Baath state under Hafez al-Asad. 
   In 1983 Fatah officer Said Abu Musa Muragha ended his relationship with his movement, and 
instead formed the faction Fatah – al-Intifada 66 in opposition to Yaser Arafat. He joined ranks with 
other Damascus-based groups such as the PFLP-GC and al-Saiqa which had parted with the PLO 
years ago. Syria's policies regarding the Palestinian camps didn't differ much from its overall 
political ambitions in Lebanon; it generally sought to subdue any opposition to its rule. When al-
Asad cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood in Tripoli, this also meant removing whatever was 
left of the PLO who had been funding some of the Islamic movements in the northern city 67. 
Coordinating with Syrian troops, Muragha's new faction engaged in clashes with Arafat's Fatah in 
the eastern Beqaa-valley and the northern parts of the country. Thus Nahr al-Barid,  Badawi and al-
Jalil were the first camps to be taken over by the aforementioned anti-Arafat, Damascus-based 
factions.
   As for the Beirut-area Hafez al-Asad cooperated with the Lebanese Amal-movement in targeting 
alleged PLO officials left in the camps. Through 1985 to 1987 Shatila and Burj al-Barajne came 
under lengthy sieges and suffered heavy bombardment, but the camps were never taken over 68. 
When the “camp wars” spread to Saida in 1986,  Amal was equally unsuccessful in storming Ain al-
Hilwe 69. A broad alliance of civilian militias, later to be known as the Islamic Forces, had warded 
off the attackers.
  
The aftermath of the war
Lebanese authorities abrogated the Cairo Accords in 1987, thereby officially ending its relationship 
with the PLO. In the war-ending Taif Accords of 1989 the Palestinians served as a convenient 
scapegoat, and the PLO was largely blamed for violence breaking out in the first place 70. In 1991 
an amnesty law was passed, allowing former Lebanese warlords and militia leaders to be excused 
from their actions, but this law didn't pertain to the Palestinian zuʿamā' (chieftains) 71, and tension 
between the PLO and the new Lebanese state continued. 
66 Fataḥ - al-intifāḍa  - Fatah – The uprising
67 Fatah still have strong ties to the Tripoli based Salafi movement al-Tawḥīd al-islāmī (The Unification Movement) 
who they provided with money and arms during the civil war. Although Arafat's Fatah movement is prinicpally a 
secular organization, many of its founders had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, as was the case with Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad. See Hilal Khashan, “Lebanon's Islamist Stronghold,” The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 
(2011): http://www.meforum.org/2948/lebanon-islamist-stronghold; Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the  
West Bank and Gaza, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
68 Sayegh, Too many enemies
69 Morra,  al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya fī-l-mujtamʾa al-filasṭīnī  fī lubnān
70 Roberts, Palestinians in Lebanon
71 Elizabeth Picard «The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon» in War, Institutions, and Social Change in the 
Middle East, ed. Steven Heydeman, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000)
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   The near cleansing of Fatah combatants in northern and eastern Lebanon, meant that the camps in 
these areas were to a lesser extent targeted by state sanctions as the Syrians would impose their 
control over the country at the end of the war in 1990 72 .While building materials would be allowed 
in the northern camps, the situation in the south was quite a different story. Fatah remained present, 
although severely reduced in the southern camps. Ain al-Hilwe had served as an important hideout 
for PLO-fedāi'in resisting the evacuation from the Beirut bays 73, and it would suffer because of it: 
In the post-war republic the camp increasingly came to be surrounded by checkpoints, fenced in by 
barbed wire and walls, and the population was punished with economical sanctions for harboring 
Arafat-loyalists 74. To the extent that the Palestinian community under the PLO's guardianship could 
be described as a“state within [a] state” 75, it was now one without clear leaders. 
A present-day political map of Ain al-Hilwe
Although the Cairo Accords no longer exist, the Lebanese Armed Forces largely still operate by a 
self-imposed  policy of not entering the camps and the state rarely interferes with the lives of the 
refugees. The responsibility of their well-being is left with a number of local and foreign NGOs. 
Most prominent is UNRWA, a UN agency which works to provide education, health care, financial 
support and other social services for the refugees. Inside of the country's twelve camps, agencies 
like these are integrated into a complex cobweb of informal political and social structures of 
governance. 
   Where the governance of the Lebanese state ends, the mandate of the many Popular Committees 
(al-lijān al-shʾabiyya) begin. These are mainly organized by the 19 Palestinian political factions and 
function like internal municipalities who administrate the camps financially and politically. Despite 
what their names might suggest, these committees are not elected and their representation reflect 
factional power in the given camp more than the popularity of its members 76. The same goes for the 
Security Committees (al-lijān al-amniyya) who take on police tasks and provide for security in the 
camps. 
   Since the evacuation of the PLO in 1982, a unified political force has not existed in the camps. 
Even after the re-emergence of the PLO during the mid 90s in addition to the establishment of a 
72 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 8 - 12
73 Mahmoud Abu Jabir al-Afifi, Fatah official in Shatila, interview with the author, Beirut, October 2013
74 Soheil al-Natour, author, lawyer and DFLP official, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
75 cf. The Christian Science Monitor, “The fall of the PLO's 'state within state' in Lebanon”, February 10. 1983: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0210/021046.html
76 Mohsen Saleh notes that “the strength of a faction is not only reflected in its popular support, as its own military 
power on the ground and regional support, (official and/or popular) that it enjoys, may extend and widen its 
influence." (Interview with the author, Beirut, 2014)
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Palestinian embassy in Beirut in 2011, the organization still finds itself competing with a number of 
dissident factions loyal to the Baath regime, who remain strong even after Syria's withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2005 77. The Alliance of Palestinian Forces (Taḥāluf al-qiwā  al-filasṭiniyya) 78combines 
factions with a socialistic outlook such as the PLFP-GC, Fatah – al-Intifada and al-Saiqa, with 
Islamist nationalist movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Where they differ widely in ideology, 
The Alliance factions have since the early 90s been united by their shared rejection of negotiations 
with Israel and their oppositions to the PLO which they criticize for monopolizing the Palestinians 
cause. The influence of the socialist Damascus-based groups in Lebanon matches the geographical 
extension of Syrian power during the civil war: These factions play a pivotal role in organizing the 
camps of Beirut and the north, but less so in the south. In Ain al-Hilwe it is their Islamic ally Hamas 
that holds The Alliance's strongest political card. 
   To make matters more complex, The Alliance and the PLO run parallel Popular Committees in 
nearly every camp. This not only creates a great deal of confusion for the camp dwellers, but the 
quest to form cohesive modes of governance and security is at all times challenged by any political 
disruption or conflict that takes place in the West Bank and Gaza on one hand, and along the 
Damascus / Teheran axis on the other 79. While some camps are limited to the two competing 
institutions, Ain al-Hilwe has an additional Follow-Up Committee (lajnat mutābʾaa) which seeks to 
combine the efforts of the political blocs and also includes a small number of civilians that are 
tasked with different assignments in taking care of the camp. Typically Ain al-Hilwe dwellers take 
pride in the Follow-Up Committee, and consider it to be a sign of progress. 
  
The Islamic Forces
Joining the 22 member Follow-Up Committee in Ain al-Hilwe are the Islamic Forces 80, a factional 
constellation that doesn't occur in any other camp. Its origins hark back to the civil war when a band 
of civilians, religious congregations, and Palestinian officials from several factions formed a broad 
front in order to resist the Israeli invasion of 1982. As many PLO officials either were arrested, fled 
the camp, or joined the following evacuation, these irregular militias continued to defend Ain al-
Hilwe during the camp wars of the mid 80s. As a result they came to occupy the role as a local 
Palestinian Islamic resistance before Hamas and Islamic Jihad could set up their offices in Lebanon 
77 Erling Lorentzen Sogge, Shatila under den Syriske krisa [Shatila during the Syrian crisis], Norwegian Foreign 
Service report, published internally, 2014
78 Commonly referred to as simply al-Taḥāluf, meaning the Alliance
79 Mohsen Saleh, General director of the Beirut based think tank and publisher house al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & 
Consultations, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
80 al-Qūwa al-islāmīyya – The Islamic Forces
                                                                      20
81.
   It is difficult to pinpoint exactly who the Islamic Forces are, as the organization is loosely defined. 
A number of individuals and smaller groups operate under its banner, but don't necessarily have 
official ties to its leadership. Its main core can, however, be traced back to three movements 82 :
 al-Ḥaraka al-al-islāmiyya al-mujāhida (The Islamic Combatant Movement)
This group is perhaps better known by its prominent leader and the influential Imam of the al-Nur 
Mosque, Shaykh Jamal Khattab who is also the secretary of the Islamic Forces. The movement was 
an active militia during the civil war and retains an armed force in the camp, but has since taken the 
profile of a pious movement more than a militant one. The group has a Salafi outlook, albeit with 
heavy nationalist undertones. In the words of Khattab “...the Salafis here [in Ain al-Hilwe] have 
rather a moderate attitude, especially for us, the Palestinians. Our country is occupied. Our energy is 
focused on our country” 83 . 
Uṣbat al-anṣār al-islāmiyya (The Islamic League of Partisans)
Ideologically Usbat al-Ansar resemble no other official Palestinian group in Lebanon in that they 
are Jihadi-Salafis and reject both notions of nationalism and democracy. Whereas the militia is not 
able to compete with the popularity of Shaykh Jamal and his group, it makes up for its lack of pious 
credentials in sheer firepower; with around 200 armed militants it is reputed to be one of the 
heaviest armed groups in the camp 84. If Khattab and his movement are the brain behind the Islamic 
Islamic Forces, Usbat al-Ansar are the muscle
Anṣār allah (Partisans of God)
Led by Former Fatah commander Jamal Suleiman, Ansar Allah are technically not a part of the 
Islamic Forces as an organization, but are included here as they are the third Lebanon-based 
Islamist faction to be integrated with the Palestinian movements. Often described as the Palestinian 
version of Hizballah, the group is looked at with suspicion by some of their Salafi coleagues. 
81  Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya fī-l-mujtamʾa al-filasṭīnī  fī lubnān
82 For the sake of clarity I have here excluded Ḥizb al-taḥrīr (The Liberation Party). Although the international Pan-
Islamist group reportedly is apart of the organization, they don't participate in Palestinian factionalism.
In an conversation with Jamal Khattab aired on al-Mayadeen, the Shaykh also understood Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
to be on board his team in a broader sense, although the two groups underlined  in interviews with the author that 
they belonged to The Alliance and no other political bloc. See Al-Mayadeen, “ḥiwār al-sāʼaa: khalfīāt faṣl al-līnū 
min ḥarakat fataḥ wa-l-khilafāt al-falisṭīniyya dākhil al-mukhayyamāt [The talk of the hour : Backgrounds for the 
split between al-Lino and the Fatah movement and Palestinian conflicts in the camps],” October 8. 2013
83 Jamal Khattab cited in Mohamad Aburous, “Salafi leader Khattab calls for Sunni-Shia reconciliation,” Anti-
Imperialist Camp, August 22. 2010:  http://www.antiimperialista.org/node/6577
84 Daily Star journalist Mohammad Zaatari, Phone interview with author, January 2014
                                                                      21
According to their military leader Maher Oweid, members of the group were trained by Hizballah to 
help fight the Israeli occupants of southern Lebanon between 1989 and 1990 85. However, as of late 
2012 Hizballah severed their ties to the militia, allegedly because of Ansar Allah's support of the 
Syrian uprising 86. The group vows to continue on the path of jihad and resistance as an 
“independent Palestinian Islamist movement that will continue to uphold the rights [of the 
Palestinians] no matter how great our sacrifice is” 87. Ansar Allah differ from the other Ain al-Hilwe 
groups in that they also have a presence in some other camps 88.
A divided Fatah
Whereas Fatah's hegemony in Ain al-Hilwe is contested by both the Alliance and the Islamic 
Forces, the organization might be said to be equally challenged by reoccurring bouts of internal 
rivalry. Located near the Bustan al-Yahudi neighborhood along the north-western side of the camp,
Munir al-Maqdah is a renowned  and well respected political figure. He was one of the Fatah 
officials to stay behind and fight Israel in 1982, but is perhaps better known as the founder of the 
al-Aqsa Brigades in Palestine. Despite this, his relationship with the mother organization has at 
times been rocky. When the Oslo accords went public in 1993, he fell out with the leadership of 
Arafat and instead started his own militia in Ain al-Hilwe aligning with the rejectionist pro-Syrian 
forces. A reconciliation was initiated and he rejoined Fatah's mainstream in late 1998, 89 but was 
again in 2010 relieved of his duties as a PLO commander on the grounds of not complying with 
president Mahmoud Abbas' leadership in the West Bank 90. In 2012 his personal military faction was 
dissolved and reintegrated into the PLO's newly formed National Security Forces 91 led by Subhi 
Abu Arab. The decision was reportedly an attempt to centralize security responsibilities and put an 
end to the seemingly endless rivalry between  al-Maqdah and Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, both running 
their own Fatah-groups 92.
85 Maher Oweid cited in NOW News Lebanon, “A call to arms: three Palestinian militant groups,” November 6. 2010:
      https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/a_call_to_arms_three_palestinian_militant_groups_
86 The Daily Star “Hammoud Mediates for Hezbollah and Ansar Allah”, December 7. 2012:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2012/Dec-07/197542-hammoud-mediates-for-hezbollah-and-
ansar-allah.ashx#axzz306BjuWR0 
87 Ansar Allah cited in the Daily Star “Palestinian Islamist group severs Hezbollah ties,” December 5. 2012:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Dec-05/197252-palestinian-islamist-group-severs-hezbollah-
ties.ashx#axzz306BjuWR0
88  Ra'fat Morra, author and media spokesperson for Hamas, interview with the author, Beirut, December 2013
89 Suleiman, “The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of 
Lebanon”, 66
90 The National, “PLO leadership in power struggle over Lebanese refugee camps,” March 30. 2010:
      http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/plo-leadership-in-power-struggle-over-lebanese-refugee-camps
91 The Daily Star, “ National Security Forces take over Ain al-Hilweh checkpoint,” April 10. 2012:
      http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Apr-10/169729-national-security-forces-take-over-ain-al-
hilweh-checkpoint.ashx#axzz2yQfLYnSn
92 The Daily Star,“ National Security Forces take over Ain al-Hilweh checkpoint”
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  Issa, residing at the southern entrance of the camp in the Sufriyye neighborhood, is best known as 
the previous head of al-Kifāḥ al-mussalaḥ 93 , PLO's recently dismantled military branch in 
Lebanon. In October 2013 he was fired from Fatah on allegations of receiving personal funds from 
Muhammad Dahlan; the Palestinian president's bitter rival. Issa is now heavily guarded by his 
private entourage of armed bodyguards. The father of five is determined to stay despite almost 
routinely finding himself to be the target of assassination attempts 94. Contradictory to media reports 
he doesn't figure the attacks to be coming from Jihadi gangs based along the eastern Fawqāni-street, 
by locals sometimes described as the Area of Death (Minṭaqat al-maut): “Let's be clear; any faction 
or group could be behind these actions, as any one of them could be penetrated by foreign hostile 
elements. This is the reality in our camp” 95. 
Security and arms
After heavy clashes broke out in Ain al-Hilwe between the PLO and the post-war Lebanese state in 
1991, an attempt was made to handover the camp's armory but the process was never finished due 
to a breakdown in communication between the parts 96. While a 2004 U.N. Security council 
resolution calls for the “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” 97, the Palestinian 
factions to date remain largely armed. A mantra often heard is that the question of arms will be dealt 
with only in the framework of a broader discussion about the refugees' civil rights 98, although some 
factions, like Islamic Jihad, say they would retain their weapons in any case 99. In the view of 
Hamas leader Ali Barake the weapons is something that make the host country respect the 
Palestinians: “They particularly respect Ain al-Hilwe because of its arms” 100. 
   While the Palestinian weapons might be a headache for the Lebanese state, camp dwellers 
themselves commonly feel that a bigger problem is a lack of monopoly of arms. “In Ain al-Hilwe 
we have more guns than people. Everyone is armed” 101 an inhabitant claimed.“The camp lives on 
its nerves. The smallest conflict will result in someone getting shot. And then we wait for the 
retaliation”another shared  102. The camps are densely populated societies where unemployment is 
93 al-Kifāḥ al-mussalaḥ – The Armed Struggle
94  Mahmoud Abu al-Abd al-Lino Issa, interview with the author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
95  Mahmoud Abu al-Abd al-Lino Issa, interview with the author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
96 Soheil al-Natour, Interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
97 UN, “Security Council declares support for free, fair presidential election in Lebanon; calls for withdrawal of 
foreign forces there,” UN.org, February 9. 2004: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm
98 Ahmad Mustafa, DFLP official in the Burj al-Barajne camp, interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
99  Abu Ashraf, leader of Islamic Jihad in the Burj al-Barajne camp, Interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
100  Ali Barake, interview with author, Beirut November 2013
101 “Fatime”,  a young Palestinian from Syria currently living in Ain al-Hilwe, interview with author, Beirut, October 
         2013
102 “Rahaf”, an Ain al-Hilwe inhabitant taking weekly classes in the Burj al-Barajne camp, interview with author,   
        Beirut, January 2014
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high, and social desperation is widespread; it doesn't take much for conflict to erupt 103. Given that 
most people in the camps have allegiance to a broad set of social groups, be they factions, clan like 
social structures, or extended family, even petty conflicts can take on a level of political or factional 
disputes 104. While this is the reality in most camps, Ain al-Hilwe is unique as camp dwellers figure 
the root of violence to be Palestinian political divisions 105. This might in part be explained by the 
fact that Ain al-Hilwe until recently has had two parallel security committees. 
   In other camps the security committees are joint projects employing several factions, although 
they commonly are led by one dominant group. The Islamic Forces have however for quite some 
time retained their own security committee, working in parallel with the PLO one. Internal rivalry 
being what it is, the camp is understood to be divided into eight overlapping security zones, that are 
controlled by a number of formal and informal factions 106. In an attempt to overcome security 
issues the National and Islamic Forces of Ain al-Hilwe are at the time of writing planning to form a 
Trilateral Committee (lajna thulāthīyya) to tend to security measures. Reportedly the committee 
will be led by Fatah (PLO), Hamas (The Alliance), and Usbat al-Ansar (Islamic Forces) 107. 
The clandestine militants
There are still armed groups in and around the camp who retain an antagonistic attitude towards the 
Palestinian factions and their ever-changing security plans.
   Where brick walls and barbed wire follow the camp along its western and eastern sides, the 
northern neighborhoods around the Bustan al-Yahudi street float seamlessly into the adjacent Lower 
al-Tamir and al-Tawari-areas 108. By extension of the camp, these neighborhoods have gone from 
being a center of power and economic prosperity during the PLO years (1969 – 1982), to being 
destroyed during the Israeli invasion of 1982 and suffer losses in the following war of the camps 109. 
In post-war Lebanon al-Tawari and al-Tamir have come to be societies as enclosed and 
103 Author's interview with employee of the NGO Beit Atfal al-Somoud who wished to remain unnamed, Beirut, 
October 2013
104 During my field study in the Shatila camp, an accusation made against a member of a local NGO, overnight turned 
into a conflict between the PFLP and Hamas, given the allegiance of the people involved. Rumors had it that Hamas 
people were planning to light the NGO on fire, but the leaders of the factions were able to diffuse the tension in the 
run of a week (Field notes October 28. 2013)
105 Pursue Ltd, Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: A Survey of Four Camps, (Beirut: Pursue ltd the Fall of
       2013), figures 22 – 28.
106 Franklin Lamb, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
107 Al-Balad, “Tawāfuq filasṭīnī ʻalā tafʻaīl al-qūwa al-amnīyya al-mushtaraka fī ʻain al-ḥilwe [Palestinian agreement 
to activate the Joint Security Force in Ain al-Hilwe],” April 14. 2014: 
http://www.jokes.albaladonline.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?pageid=154872
108 Tʿamīr al-taḥta - Lower Tamir. The name Tamir, in arabic meaning «construction» hints towards the building of the 
neighborhood in the wake of an earthquake that hit Saida in 1965. The lower and upper al-Tamir neighborhoods are 
separated by al-Ṭawāri' in the middle. Often people refer to these areas as one place: “al-Tamir / al-Tawari” 
109 Ghandour, “Who is 'Ain al-Hilweh?”
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impoverished as the camp itself. In fact, many inhabitants in he adjacent neighborhoods north of 
Ain al-Hilwe feel they are worse off than the refugees, since they are not supported by the social 
services that the camp dwellers receive 110. In Lebanon al-Tamir is perhaps best known as the home 
of pop-singer Fadel Shaker, who in later years has renounced his career and joined the radical Salafi 
cleric Ahmad al-Asir, becoming one of the group's most proactive voices 111. Al-Asir's rhetorical 
warfare against the Lebanese state has had a certain resonance among the marginalized working 
class neighborhoods of Saida, where he often would perform sit-ins urging his followers to confront 
Hizballah for bullying the country's Sunnis 112. In July 2013 mounting tension led to full-blown 
clashes against the army, after which both al-Asir and Shaker took refuge in Ain al-Hilwe 113. Not 
surprisingly Palestinian officials are adamant that al-Tamir and al-Tawari are not apart of Ain al-
Hilwe, and are thus outside of their jurisdiction. When speaking to Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, the 
former Fatah commander suggested it would be better if “the Lebanese blocked these 
neighborhoods off from the camp”, seeing as they formed an “open door for suspicious groups” to 
enter the camp community 114. 
   True as this might be, Ain al-Hilwe also hosts a number of smaller clandestine armed groups who 
consist of Palestinians, many of whom are native to the camp. Residing in the al-Tairi neighborhood 
along the al-Fawqāni street, a young man named Bilal Badr has since 2012 run his own militia. The 
group, allegedly  numbering around 30 – 50 combatants, has recently taken on the moniker “The 
Muslim Youth” (al-shābān al-muslimīn). In addition to Badr we also find number of other 
prominent “Islamist activists”, as they often are described in local media, that surround themselves 
with clan-like entourages of armed followers 115. Many of these are wanted by the Lebanese state, 
such as cleric and Ain al-hilwe-resident Baha al-Din, who has been linked to the controversial 
Abdallah Azzam Brigades 116, the organization to claim the suicide attacks against the Iranian 
embassy in Beirut on October 19. 2013 117.
110 Ghandour, “Who is 'Ain al-Hilweh?”
111 Al Arabiya, “From Fantastic to Fanatic:: Radicalized Arab Pop Star Fadel Shaker,” March 1, 2014:
    http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/03/01/From-fantastic-to-fanatic-Radicalization-of-Lebanese-   
    pop-star-Fadel-Shaker.html 
112 Al-Monitor, “Sheikh Al-Assir's Militants Kill Lebanese Soldiers in Sidon,” June 24, 2013:
      http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/lebanon-sidon-assir-salafists-kill-army.html
113 Their whereabouts are disputed, but former Fatah official Mahmoud al-Lino Issa claimed the two were in the camp 
as of January 2014 (interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
114 Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
115 Names that frequently came up during my field study were Tawfiq Taha, Usama al-Shehabi, Haytham al-Shaabi.
These, along with Bilal Badr, were thought to be affiliated with a number of different groups, ranging from the 
Abdallah Azzam brigades, the remnants of the groups Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-Sham to the Syrian branch of al-
Qaida; Jabhat al-Nusra. These statements were often contradictory to one another, and impossible to verify. 
116 katā'ib ʿabd allah ʿazzām – The Abdallah Azzam Brigades
117 The Daily Star, “Palestinians deny bomber lived in Ain al-Hilweh,” December 10.2013: 
http://dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Dec-10/240506-palestinians-deny-bomber-lived-in-ain-al-
hilweh.ashx#axzz2vNmUe3Cy
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   The camp's clandestine groups are commonly thought to contribute to the turmoil the community 
periodically experiences, but are not alone in using violence. During the spring of 2014 the camp 
witnessed a string of night-time assassinations where a number of people associated with the 
aforementioned clandestine militias have turned up dead. While an Ansar Allah official blamed the 
“wave of assassinations” on Israel 118, Social media pages connected to Ain al-Hilwe were 
experiencing something resembling a media campaign where supporters of Badr's group were 
calling out members of Fatah and the Islamic Forces, claiming them to be behind the murders 119. In 
mid May the tension resulted in an armed standoff between Bilal Badr's group and the entourage of 
Fatah official Talal al-Urduni 120.
   In the midst of the clashes, a spontaneous civilian mass protest broke out, where people poured 
out in the streets condemning the violence. The protesters could be heard calling out both Fatah and 
what they understood to be the Jihadi group Jund al-Sham, as they shouted “Ismʿaū ya msallaḥīn,  
hayyā ʿalā ṭarīq filasṭīn! - Listen up gunmen, get going on your way to Palestine!” 121.
   Conclusion
In his seminal work on the history of Beirut, Samir Kassir notes that the tragedy of pre-civil war 
Lebanon was ironically its rare form of pluralism where no community seemed to constitute a 
majority and no political bloc could stake its claim to preeminence, thus causing conflict to be 
constant 122. In many ways the Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilwe seems to have suffered the 
same fate. It is perhaps a Fatah stronghold, as well as a base for Jihadi militias, but it is more than 
anything contested ground.
  In this chapter we have seen how the outcome of the civil war has to a high degree determined the 
present day Palestinian political landscape in the country. Through their patronage to Hafez al-Asad 
118 Ansar Allah spokesperson Ghassan Hmeid cited in The Daily Star “Gunmen shoot Fatah al-Islam official in Ain al-
Hilweh,” May 9. 2014: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/May-09/255839-gunmen-shoot-
fatah-al-islam-official-in-ain-al-hilweh.ashx#axzz329kkZVBY
119 Talal al-Urduny [from Fatah] will pay for his crimes. He has death in store for him“, one commenter said. “Every 
       faction is more deranged than the previous” another added: “Don't tell me 'Fatah', don't say 'the 
       Islamic factions', they are all despicable dogs […] you conceal your agendas, putting them before the interest of 
       our people, and our sons and our daughters...”. Comments retrieved  from the Facebook site Aṣdiqā' mukhayyam  
       ʿain al-ḥilwe [Friends of Ain al-Hilwe] after the news of one of Bilal Badr's constituents were published in May 
       2014: https://www.facebook.com/AsdkaaMokhayamAinAlHelwe 
120 al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, “mukhayyam ʿain al-ḥilwe: tabādul iṭlāq al-nār bayna majmūʿat 
bilāl badr wa ṭalāl al-urdunī [The Ayn al-Hilwe camp: Exchange of fire between the Bilal Badr group and Talal al-
Urduni],” May 13. 2014: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/67419.html?print
121 Video from the protests, retrieved from the Facebook page of Aṣdiqā' mukhayyam ʿain al-ḥilwe:
 https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=634917149935288&set=vb.308146319262849&type=2&theater
      [Accessed May 15.2014]
122 Samir Kassir, Beirut, trans. M.B. Debevoise, (University of California Press, 2010), 440
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the Pro-Syrian dissident factions of the Alliance came to play an important role in organizing the 
north and the Beirut area; a role they retain even after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. 
The PLO has since their expulsion made a comeback, but in terms of camp authority they are 
contested even in their alleged southern strongholds. Since the end of the civil war the Islamic 
Forces, led by the renowned Jamal Khattab, have been a central component in the camp's Follow-
Up Committee and social life in Ain al-Hilwe. Whereas this committee gathers all factions in the 
camp, security has largely been left up to individual efforts; sometimes even within the same 
faction, as is the case with the local Fatah faction. The several security zones of the camp, with each 
group protecting their “own neighborhood”, must be said to be a result of no movement being able 
to constitute the stronger part. This also contributes to the reoccurring turmoil the camp periodically 
goes through.
   Another destabilizing factor are the many clandestine Jihadi groups that oppose, and to some 
extent antagonize the Palestinian factions, although it must be noted that the largest Jihadist militias 
have chosen to work alongside the mainstream movements. This is evident when looking at the new 
trilateral security formation where Hamas and Fatah are joined by Usbat al-Ansar in being its main 
contributors. This gives us an image of who wields military power in the camp, but raises another 
question: How did the two biggest movements in the Palestinian world come to share power with a 
local Jihadi Salafi militia in Ain al-Hilwe? In the next chapter we will look closer at this group.
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4 Usbat al-Ansar: From local to global Jihad
     “Before and after the fall of the Caliphate the people have lived in a bitter reality. Our Islamic lands have been 
      infested with the ideas by nationalist thought, communism and secularism. The enemies of Islam have taken 
     advantage of the opportunity, ravaging our soil with corruption by trying to convince the sons of the Umma  
      that it is because of their religion and their creed that they have been struck by backwardness and  
     depravity...»   Internal brochure published by Usbat al-Ansar,  123
It was mainly after the the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11. 2001 that researches 
operating within the realm of Terror studies started to take note of Ain al-Hilwe. While foreign 
fighters kept pouring into the battle fields of the Afghan (2001) and Iraqi (2003) wars, it became a 
concern to map out the places they were being recruited from. Ain al-Hilwe turned out to be one of 
them. In the early 2000s American political scientist Gary Gambill wrote a series of articles on the 
camp claiming it “has been linked to virtually every case of al-Qaeda activity in Lebanon, while 
renegade terrorists residing in the camp have been tied to the global terror network's operations in 
Jordan, Turkey and elsewhere in the region” 124. Jonathan Schanzer made Ain al-Hilwe one of his 
main destinations on the terror map while tracing “Al-Qaeda's Armies” in the book with the same 
name from 2005 125, as Blake Ward listed the leader of Usbat al-Ansar to have been one of Bin 
Laden's most important henchmen during the 90's 126. 
  While Usbat al-Ansar's controversial nature brought them to the center of attention in a wast array 
of studies during the early 2000s, it was another Jihadi-Salafi group that would make the headlines 
when the Nahr al-Barid camp exploded in the summer of 2007. The violent battle between Fatah al-
Islam and The Lebanese Armed Forces was by many seen as a logical conclusion to the emergence 
of groups that already had gained prominence in Ain al-Hilwe, but during the turmoil things took a 
different turn in the southern camp. The events that transpired showed Usbat al-Ansar displaying a 
level of pragmatism that set them aside from their clandestine Jihadist contemporaries in Lebanon. 
   In this chapter I will analyze the evolution of Usbat al-Ansar, as I follow them from their 
inception as an Iranian-backed resistance militia, into becoming a global Jihadist movement, and 
eventually venture into cooperation with the Palestinian mainstream movements. First off we will 
123 Usbat al-Ansar publication with no date cited in Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya , 173
124 Gary C. Gambill, “Ain al-Hilweh: Lebanon's 'Zone of  unlaw'”, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol.5, no 6, June 
2003: http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0306_l1.htm
125 Jonathan Schanzer, “Al-Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror” (New  
     York: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005)
126 Blake D. Ward, “Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of al Qaeda,” The Future Warfare Series vol. 32, (2005): 
14, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/ward2.pdf 
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take a closer look at what the concepts of Jihadi-Salafism and Global Jihadism actually involve.
   Who are the Jihadi-Salafis? 
This far we've left both Salafism and Jihadism undefined. The Arabic adjective salafī  is derived 
from the term al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, the pious ancestors, which refers to the first three generations of 
Muslims whose way of conduct and building an Islamic society serves as an ideal for the 
movement. The birth of Salafi thought is commonly attributed to Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703 - 1792) who in his Kitāb al-tawḥīd, Book of unification, urged fellow believers to 
return to a total and exclusive worship of God alone 127. This involved purging the faith of all human 
bias or traditional practices considered to be bidʿa, or innovation. Where Salafis are united when it 
comes to the principle of God's oneness, they often differ in the application of it. Based on this, 
Wiktorowicz 128 divides Salafi scholars into three archetypes: “Purists” who avoid politics and vie to 
change society through Islamic proselytism, or daʿwa, “Politicos” who seek influence through the 
political arena, and finally the marginal branch of “Jihadists”, who strive to achieve their goals 
through violence. 
   It should be noted that Jihadism is a problematic term as not many would describe themselves as a 
jihādī in Arabic. The derived adjective mujāhid is often used, but is also fairly general and doesn't 
necessarily describe more than just a combatant. That being said the expression Jihadi-Salafism (al-
salafīyya al-jihādīyya) is usually linked to the contemporary Jordanian agitator Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi who rose to fame in the early 1990s. Meijer views his ideology a highly politicized version 
of the teachings of The Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayid Qutb, with an emphasis on the 
oneness and sovereignty of God's rule (tawḥīd al-ḥākimīyya) 129. 
   Judging by the targets that groups within the Jihadi sphere choose, scholars often distinguish 
between those who fight the “Near enemy”, and the “Far enemy” 130. The former presumably 
meaning “morally corrupt” Muslim governments close to oneself, while the latter refers to global 
entities such as the USA, Israel, or even governments in the Arab world such as the Iraqi one. 
Hegghammer sees the dichotomy between the near and the far as insufficient as it doesn't tell us 
much about the ideologies at play; he instead distinguishes between “Revolutionaries” and “Global 
127 Terje Østebø, Localising Salafism: Religious Change Among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), 1
128 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
vol. 29, no 3 (2006): doi: 10.1080/10576100500497004 
129 Roel Meijer, “Introduction” in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Meijer, (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 24 - 25
130 Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 )
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Jihadists”. “Revolutionary Islamism”, Hegghammer writes “advocates military confrontation with 
Muslim regimes in order to topple them and capture the state. Global jihadism promotes military 
confrontation with the United  States and her allies, to avenge and deter non-Muslim oppression of 
Muslims “131. As we will discover, Usbat al-Ansar's has oscillated between practicing both 
revolutionary and global Jihadism.
Who are Usbat al-Ansar?
Many of the leading positions of Usbat al-Ansar are occupied by the al-Saadi family. They are 
natives to the camp but trace their roots back to the northern Palestinian village of Ṣafṣāf in Galilee; 
incidentally their headquarters are also found in the Safsaf neighborhood of Ain al-Hilwe. Usbat al-
Ansar has been led by Abu Tareq al-Saadi ever since his brother and previous leader Abd al-Karim 
Abu Muhjin al-Saaidi was sentenced to death in absentia in the late 90s, forcing him into going 
underground. Most people might however associate Usbat al-Ansar with its spokesperson and 
Islamic scholar Wafiq Abu Sharif Aql who provides the movement with a certain religious alibi. His 
Friday sermons at the Martyr's Mosque are often antagonistic in language: Here the Sunni 
community is typically blamed for being weak in their religion, failing to stand up up against their 
oppressors in Iraq and Syria among other places. 
   Although they claim to be innocent in most of the charges directed at them, a portion of Usbat al-
Ansar's member base has been found guilty, by Lebanese courts, in committed a long list of crimes 
ranging from shooting people bringing alcohol into Ain al-Hilwe and staging a number of deadly 
explosions in Saida, to killing four Lebanese judges in 1999, a cleric in 1995, and plotting the failed 
assassinations of the former American and Italian ambassadors in the early 2000s 132. Pending death 
penalties has become a family trait for the al-Saadis.
    The group is not only controversial because of its violent history, but also because of its tendency 
to put more emphasis on the global injustices of Muslims than the Palestinians bereft of their land. 
The main political goal of Usbat al-Ansar is no less than to make the world ready for the re-
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate 133. Whereas a number of clandestine movements or 
131 Thomas Hegghammer,“The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,  
November 18. 2009: http://www.hudson.org/research/9866-the-ideological-hybridization-of-jihadi-groups
132 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “ʿ usbat al-anṣār tukaffir kull al-anẓima bistithnā' ṭalibān wa amīruha abū muḥjin maṭlūb lil-ʿ 
adāla bi tuhmat al-irhāb” [Usbat al-Ansar commits takfir against every regime except from Taliban, and 
their'“emir'Abu Muhjin is wanted by the justice ministry on charges of terrorism],” October 17. 2001:
      http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=62027&issueno=8359#.U3QoIijRZSP;
U.S Department of State, Country report on terrorism 2012, May 30. 2012:
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209989.htm;
Rougier, Everyday Jihad
133 Yasin, ʿuṣbat al-anṣār minʿisāba 'ilā ʿaāmil 'istiqrār fī lubnān [The League of Partisans: From an Armed   
        Gang to an Agent of  Stability in Lebanon], Saidadays.com, May 4. 2013
 http://saidadays.com/news.php?go=fullnews&newsid=15834
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individuals operating in Ain al-Hilwe might fit the description of Jihadi-Salafis, Usbat al-Ansar is 
the only one of the current 19 factions in Lebanon to describe themselves in this manner 134. In fact 
the group believes “secularism, democracy, socialism, and nationalism” to be ideas “alien to Islam” 
and adhering to these principles is in their eyes equal to apostasy – a crime punishable by death 135. 
They understand jihād to be the act of “combating infidels, apostates and the enemies of God”, and 
is, in their eyes, a duty for every Muslim living under the rule of governments following a different 
path than that of “The laws of Islam” 136. Despite there perhaps being a mutual admiration between 
al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usbat al-Ansar, there is little if any proof of official ties 
between the two 137; the latter deny any connection and say they differ with al-Qaida on key-issues: 
Usbat al-Ansar doesn't approve of the network's attacks on “innocent Muslims” 138 and it doesn't 
view Lebanese soldiers nor the country's UNIFIL forces as legit targets 139. Whereas the group 
considers the PLO an organization to be “outside of Islam”, it claims it doesn't pass judgment on the 
individual members – it explains two decades of reoccurring violent drag-out clashes with the 
principally secular Fatah, to be a matter of the other part not accepting any contestants to its 
hegemony in Ain al-Hilwe 140.
   
   The origins of jihadi Salafism in Ain al-Hilwe
A Teheran-backed Jihad
The founders of the first Jihadi-Salafi militia in the Palestinian community in Lebanon ironically 
received military training from communists. After the civil war broke out in 1975, the PLO drafted 
many of the youth of the southern camps to enroll in the military training programs of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 141. Hisham Shraidi, born in Ain al-Hilwe in 1957, was 
in fact himself at one point a member of the PFLP, although he later left the organization to join 
both the Islamist Hizb al-Tahrir and the local Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood; al-
134 Abu Sharif Aql in Al Arabiya, “zʿaīm ʿuṣbat al-anṣār yataḥaddath ʿan al-ʿalāqa mʿa tanẓīm al-qāʿida [Usbat al-
Ansar chief talks about the relations with al-Qaida],” June 17. 2007: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/06/17/35582.html
135 Internal brochure with no date cited in  Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 174
136  Internal brochure with no date cited in Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 178
137 Muhammad Zaatari, Journalist of the Daily Star, Phone interview with the author, Beirut, January 2014
138 Abu Sharif Aql cited in Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 180 - 181
139 When al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims to attack UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, Usbat al-Ansar denounced this idea 
       saying it would be better to keep “the jihad within the realm of Iraq (...) If we beat them there, we will beat them 
        here”. See Al Arabiyya, June 17. 2007
140 Abu Sharif Aql in Morra,  al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 180 - 181
141 Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 10
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Jamaa al-Islamiyya 142 143. He was among many combatants to fight Israel during their invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, and as a consequence was sent to an Israeli jail after Ain al-Hilwe was overrun 
and bulldozed to pieces, having lost the battle against its invaders 144. Shraidi however returned to 
the camp after being freed in a prisoner exchange and assumed the role as a preacher at the small 
Martyr's Mosque 145. Eventually cutting ties with his previous affiliations, he started to gather his 
own adherents in the mosque community, and in 1985 he formed the group Ansar Allah 146, later to 
be renamed Usbat al-Ansar.
   After the evacuation of the PLO, the dynamics of resistance had changed in the southern camps. 
Many Palestinian militia leaders had fled or been arrested, and those who were left had few means 
to defend the refugee communities as the civil war would go into its last phase. When staving off 
the Lebanese Forces 147 in the battle of southern Saida in 1985, it was armed Palestinian Islamists 
fighting under the banners of the militias of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya that predominantly led the 
resistance 148. In the opinion of the prominent imam of the al-Quds Mosque in Saida, Mahir 
Hammoud, it was these battles that set in stone a mentality that merged the militarism and violence 
of the civil war with Islamic activism, that came to serve as a foundation for Usbat al-Ansar 149. 
According to the imam, Shraidi could be described as a person that was «unique in his courage, in 
his prowess and physical force – not so much in his knowledge of  iʿlm or clear Islamic concepts» 
150. Despite the Jihadi leanings of the charismatic Shaykh Shraidi, the earliest incarnation of his 
group didn't subscribe to the tenants of Salafi thought - further it had strong ties to the Teheran-
backed militant Shiite-Islamists who around the same time were forming Hizballah 151.
   Shraidi's campaign of increasingly antagonizing speeches targeting both the leadership of Yaser 
Arafat and the local Fatah-faction, whom he claimed had “betrayed the religion of Palestine”, 
clearly coincided with Iran's falling out with the PLO over attending the Madrid peace conference 
in 1991 152. When clashes ensued between Fatah and Hizballah in the outskirts of the camp, Shraidi 
142Al-jamāʿaa al-islāmīyya – The Islamic Group. A mainstream Lebanese Sunni-movement and political party in the 
March 14. Alliance. 
143 Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya , 173
144 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 46
145Masjid al-shuhadā' – The martyr's mosque. Nearly 30 years later it is still the headquarters of Usbat al-Ansar in Ain 
al-Hilwe in the Safsaf neighborhood .
146 Not to be confused with the present day Jihadi movement run by Jamal Suleiman, which was formed already in  
       1982
147Al-quwwāt al-lubnānīyah  - The Lebanese Forces. A Maronite political party formed by Samir Geagea. Not to be 
confused with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as in the official Lebanese military.
148 Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 69
149 Hammoud in Al Arabiya documentary “ʿuṣbat al-anṣār,” 2008: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9s0tvOCFlU
150 Hammoud in Al Arabiya documentary «ʿuṣbat al-anṣār.”
151 Al Jazeera “al-salafīūn fī  lubnān: al-t'arjuḥ bayna al-dʿawa wal-sillāḥ [The Salafis in Lebanon: fluctuating 
between proselytization and guns],” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, November 15. 2012: 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2012/11/2012111593541563647.htm 
152 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 47
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sided with the latter 153. The animosity between the charismatic shaykh and Fatah leader Amin 
Kayid was likely to have contributed to Shraidi's assassination in 1991, where he was shot by an 
unidentified attacker. When his successor, Abd al-Karim Abu Muhjin al-Saadi, would transform 
Shraidi's Ansar Allah into Usbat al-Ansar, ties to Islamist Shiism to the likes of Hizballah were cut, 
introducing an ideology that was a huge departure from other Palestinian Islamist movements. Abu 
Muhjin did however preserve the mentality of civil war militarism in his bid to purge society of 
Islam's enemies.
Aligning with the Lebanese Salafi current
Rougier understands the social misery that Ain al-Hilwe experienced at the end of the war, being 
fenced in with barbed wires and cut off from the outside world, to have paved the way for global 
Salafism taking root in the camp 154. It is possible to imagine that the Palestinian identity, offering 
nothing but restrictions in the new republic, seemed so much of a burden to carry that youth found 
an escape in affirming a broader Sunni-identity - one extending past the cramped confines of a 
refugee camp. In any event, looking at the political climate in Lebanon in the early 90s, Ain al-
Hilwe looks to have been a recipient of ideas predominantly being formed outside of its bounds. 
The ideological shift away from Iranian tutelage must bee seen in context of a broader Lebanese 
Salafi current being shaped in the northern city of Tripoli 155, but also in Saida at this point in time. 
   During the civil war the prominent Salafi preacher Dai al-Islam al-Shahhal had been forced to 
relocate his activities to Saida as Syrian troops targeted the Islamic Unification Movement 156 of 
Tripoli with harsh military campaigns, assassinations and persecution during the civil war 157. In the 
post-war republic, the Unification Movement came to be an influential voice in Sunni-politics as 
they positioned themselves against the forces operating within the Damascus/Teheran axis, 
effectively laying the groundwork for an epistemological battle of Islamists on either side of the 
divide. The pro-Syrian and Sufi-oriented Association the Islamic Charitable Projects 158, commonly 
referred to simply as Al-Aḥbāsh (The Ethopians), launched a counter campaign against the growing 
trend of Salafism which it understood to be an infiltration of «extremists» into the mosques of 
153 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 47
154 Rougier, Everyday Jihad
155 Ṭrāblus - Tripoli
156 Ḥarakat al-tawḥīd al-islāmī, held to be the founders of Salafism in Lebanon
157 Nadine Elali, “NOW's guide to Lebanese Salafism,” NOW News Lebanon, July 11. 2012: 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowspecials/nows_guide_to_lebanese_salafism_
158 Jamʿaiat al-mashārīʿa al-khayrīyya al-islāmīyya – The Association of Islamic Charitable projects. The group 
aqquired its nickname, al-aḥbāsh (The Ethopians), because its Ethiopian founder, the scholar Abdallah al-Harariyy. 
He founded the group in Beirut in 1983
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Lebanon 159. This would involve physically taking control over mosques and thereby directly 
challenging the authority of the stately Sunni institution Dār al-fatwā  160. Pall notes that this turmoil 
gave the Salafis, often being dragged into violent clashes with their opponents, an opportunity to 
further affirm themselves as the true guardians of Sunni-identity in the country 161. If al-Ahbash 
hadn't already caught the attention of the militant Islamists of Ain al-Hilwe, it certainly must have 
when the organization set up a local office inside the camp. When al-Ahbash leader, Nizar al-
Halabi, was shot dead in Beirut by four gunmen on August 31. 1995, a Lebanese court found Usbat 
al-Ansar's young new leader, Abu Muhjin, guilty of having plotted the operation 162. For the 
Palestinian the sentence was death – albeit in absentia as the Lebanese state had no means of getting 
a hold of him.
Setting the stage for global jihad
According to Fatah commander Munir al-Maqdah, the long-running conflict between his movement 
and Usbat al-Ansar was more than anything a result of Hisham Shraidi and former Fatah leader 
Amin Kayid both trying to use their family ties to the Galilean city of Safsaf to mobilize political 
power in Ain al-Hilwe – the camp perhaps wasn't big enough for them both 163. Whether the conflict 
originally had roots in Teheran-backed groups trying to use the Islamist militia in subduing Fatah's 
control over Ain al-Hilwe in the late 80s, or actually began as a struggle involving family interests, 
the camp community would periodically live in a state of instability as the parts for nearly two 
decades engaged in violent clashes and mutual assassinations, leaving many causalities on either 
side 164. While exerting a certain degree of military prowess, Usbat al-Ansar were not only 
challenging Fatah for their checkpoints in the camp, but by expanding their territory they were also 
creating spaces for like-minded groups to exist.
   Morra considers the practice of istijāra, the Islamic concept of providing refuge for fellow 
Muslims who require it, to have been the most troubling aspect of Usbat al-Ansar 165. Although the 
group categorically denies having provided protection for any outlaws, the camp has proved to be a 
useful shelter for groups wanted by the state, ranging from elements of the Unification Movement 
159 Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe, 47 – 48 
160 A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Harair Dekmeijan, “A Sufi response to political Islamism: al-Ahbash of Lebanon,”   
       American University of Beirut 1996: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/al-ahbash.html
161 Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe, 47 – 48 
162 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “ʿ usbat al-anṣār tukaffir kull al-anẓima.”
163 al-Maqdah cited in Al Arabiya documentary “ʿuṣbat al-anṣār.”
164 Mahmoud al-Lino Issa claimed that Fatah never has had an official policy of targeting Usbat al-Ansar or any other 
       movement, but “members acting alone” had in the past carried out retaliatory attacks against the Jihadi-Salafis 
      (Interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014)
165  Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 187
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after the civil war 166, to Saida-natives such as Ahmad al-Asir in recent times. However, it was Usbat 
al-Ansar's connections to the controversial Tripoli-native Basim Abu Aisha al-Kanj that would put 
Ain al-Hilwe on the map of global Jihad. Al-Kanj had in the early 90s spent time in Peshawar, 
Pakistan mingling with personalities who would become leading figures in the al-Qaida network, 
and he had later gone to fight with an Arab mujāhid legion in Bosnia, before returning to Lebanon 
in 1996 167. Al-Kanj set up his own network in Ain al-Hilwe where he, allegedly cooperating with 
Usbat al-Ansar's Abu Muhjin, used the site as a training camp for foreign fighters 168. Despite intents 
of returning to the global battlefield, al-Kanj changed strategies and got himself killed after his 
group led a violent raid against the LAF in the northern al-Diniye region in late December 1999 – 
Early January 2000 169. Usbat al-Ansar, on the other hand, would shortly after confront the “far 
enemy” for the first time as it ventured to Iraq in 2003. According to spokesperson Abu Sharif Aql 
the group sent around twenty members to the Iraqi battlefront claiming it their right: «Islam has no 
borders – it is our duty to defend the Umma» 170.  
   Judging by Usbat al-Ansar's outlook from its inception up until the early 2000s, it is perhaps no 
wonder why the movement ended up on numerous governments' terror radars, not at least the 
Lebanese one. In the last part of this chapter, starting with the battle at Nahr al-Barid, we will see 
how the group came to take a slightly different path.
 
    When a refugee camp becomes an emirate
In the fall of 2006 a leader of the pro-Syrian faction Fatah – al-Intifada inquired his superior 
concerning the presence of a group of strangers in the Nahr al-Barid and Bedawi camps. These 
stuck out as they had long beards, were heavily armed, and seemed to be well-payed 171.  
   The newcomers would turn out to be led by the Jordanian-Palestinian Shaker al-Absi. Having 
been a PLO commander, al-Absi joined Said Muragha's rebellion against Yasir Arafat in 1983. 
Years later he found himself fighting alongside the reputed mujāhid Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, 
where he recruited foreign fighters from both Lebanon and Syria to resist the American invasion 172. 
After spending some time in a Syrian jail, al-Absi settled in Lebanon, bringing with him a band of 
foreign fighters. Upon his arrival he assumed cooperation with the mainly socialist Fatah – al-
166  Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 187
167 Tine Gade, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon: Between global and local jihad, 10 - 11
168 Tine Gade, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon: Between global and local jihad, 14
169 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 239 – 241 
170  Abu Sharif Aql cited in Al Arabiya documentary “ʿuṣbat al-anṣār.”
171 Nir Rosen Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World, (Nation Books, 2010), 197.
172 Mareb Press, “fataḥ al-islām...ḥaqa'iq wa asrār [Fatah al-Islam... truths and secrets],” May 25. 2007: 
http://marebpress.net/articles.php?lng=arabic&aid=1834
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Intififada, but announced his separation from the movement in late November 2006, creating 
instead Fatah al-Islam. In a statement al-Absi declared the new faction “an Islamic group which 
aims to fight the Jews and those who support them among western Zionists” and sought “to free the 
al-Aqsa Mosque and to protect the Sunnis of Lebanon who are subjected to elaborate persecution” 
173. 
   In Nahr al-Barid, al-Absi's group ceased three compounds belonging to his previous pro-Syrian 
affiliates and raised black flags displaying the shahāda 174 in white letters 175. Reportedly, groups of 
civilians staged sit-ins against Fatah al-Islam taking over their camp. A few local imams tried to 
calm the growing tension by vouching for the presence of al-Absi and his gang on the grounds that 
they were “pious, faithful people” 176. al-Absi was not only able to find a footing in the camp; he 
even set up his own Shura council and crowned himself the ruler of an emirate stretching from his 
throne in Nahr al-Barid and eastwards into bilād al-shām, Greater Syria 177. 
   When local Fatah – al-Intifada leader Abu Yasir inquired his superior about the newcomers, Abu 
Khalid al-Amle, the organization's second in command, got back to him from Damascus saying 
”We have new fighters (…) We must learn from Hizballah's military and discipline” 178. In an 
interview with author Nir Rosen, Abu Yasir accuses al-Amle of having gone behind the back of his 
own movement, by hiring al-Absi in order to confront “the Americans in Lebanon” 179. Even tough 
al-Absi had declared a war against the distant enemy, he would soon end up facing the near.
The “emir” didn't only evoke a controversy among camp dwellers; The Lebanese Armed Forces 
were also paying close attention to his group. After Fatah al-Islam were accused of blowing up a 
bus in Ain Alaq, east of Beirut, in early March 2007, the LAF set up checkpoints around the 
entrances of Nahr al-Barid, forcing the tension inside the camp to skyrocket 180. However, the spark 
of crises wasn't lit until two months later when the LAF prevented a gang of Fatah al-Islam 
militiamen from heisting a bank in Tripoli. Al-Absi's group retaliated by slitting the throats of 23 
173 Defection statement cited in Mohsen Saleh et. al., Awḍāʿa al-lāj'īn f ī lubnān  [The situation of the Refugees in  
Lebanon]. ( Beirut: al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2012), 172
174 In islamic terms shahāda refers to the act of testifying that “There is no god but God. Muhammad is God's 
       messenger (lā ilāha illa āllāh. muḥammadun rasūl ullāh)”
175 The New York Times, “New Face of Jihad Vows Attacks,” March 16. 2007: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/middleeast/16jihad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&
176 Hanafi and Long, “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian
      Refugee Camps of Lebanon” 
177 Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek, “Fatah al-Islam: Anthropological Perspectives on Jihadi Culture,” Real  
       Institute Elano (2008): 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/8efaad804f018b80b7fff73170baead1/WP6-2008_Taarnby-
Hallundbaek_Jihadi_Culture.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=8efaad804f018b80b7fff73170baead1
178 Abu Khalid al-Amle paraphrased by Abu Yasir, Fatah al – Intifada's leader in the northern region of Lebanon, in 
Rosen, Aftermath, 197.
179 Abu Khalid al-Amle paraphrased by Abu Yasir, Fatah al – Intifada's leader in the northern region of Lebanon, in 
Rosen, Aftermath, 197.
180 Saleh et. al., awḍāʿa al-lāj'īn f ī lubnān, 72 
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sleeping Lebanese soldiers at a nearby military base, prompting the LAF to shortly after block off 
the northern entrances of the camp. The ensuing battle would be the fiercest the Palestinians had 
witnessed since the civil war. 
   After fifteen weeks of heavy bombardment, Fatah al-Islam was crushed, and Nahr al-Barid was 
mostly reduced to rubble. 250 militants were dead, 169 Lebanese soldiers had lost their lives, and 
33 civilians were killed in the fierce violence that forced most of the camp's population of 30.000 to 
flee to other refugee camps 181.
Lessons from Nahr al-Barid
Although the PLO, like Lebanese state officials, were outspoken in their praise of the braveness of 
the soldiers that had  put an end to Shaker al-Absi's group, Palestinian representatives were deeply 
displeased with the course of action taken by the Army. Fatah had offered to participate in ousting 
Fatah al-Islam from the camp by offering the Lebanese Armed Forces 200 fighters to join efforts in 
defeating the Jihadists. “It only made sense” a Fatah leader in Beirut said:
   “Our people had access to the camp and we could have acted swiftly. But the army turned down this offer and  
   instead chose to remain outside the camp indiscriminately lobbying bombs inside. If the Lebanese [Armed 
   Forces] had trusted the PLO we could have avoided this catastrophe” 182. 
The fact remained that Fatah didn't have much support from the Palestinian movements either. PLO 
factions such as the PLFP and the DFLP had opted for a political solution 183. As had Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, who didn't denounce Fatah al-Islam but rather, in the words of sociologist Sari 
Hanafi, took a “non-stand” 184. In Hanafi's view the events at Nahr al-Barid showed a weakness in 
all Palestinian factions in managing the crisis 185. Did a lack of consensus among the movements 
that run the camp make it impossible to take action against the extremists? A PFLP official from 
Nahr al-Barid commented that there was little the factions could do about Fatah al-Islam, as they 
didn't want to “interfere with the internal affairs of Fatah - al-Intifada”186, the pro-Syrian faction he 
thought to had provided for the stay of the Jihadi-Salafis. A PFLP-GC  leader thought the Lebanese 
Armed Forces were entirely to blame for the events :“When speaking of Fatah al-Islam it is 
181 Are Knudsen: “Nahr el-Bared: The political fall-out of a refugee disaster,” in Palestinian Refugees: Identity, Space  
and Place in the Levant, ed. Knudsen and Hanafi, (London: Routledge, 2011)
182 Abu Khalil Kazim, leader of Fatah in the Beirut-area, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
183I Ziad Hammu (PFLP), leader of PLO's Popular Committee in Shatila, and Ahmad Mustafa (DFLP) until recently 
the leader of PLO's popular committee in Burj al-Barajne, interviews with author, Beirut, September and December 
2013
184 Hanafi “Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon As a Space of Exception.”
185 Hanafi “Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon As a Space of Exception.”
186 Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World, 205
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important to remember that their conflict was with the state of Lebanon, not with the Palestinians” 
Abu Musa Sabir said:
   “We are mainly socialists and we disapproved of their behavior which was irrational in many 
   ways, but what could we have done? We're not the police. I will tell you this much; If  there is
    a problem we always seek a diplomatic solution, not a violent one” 187.
“People always ask us about Fatah al-Islam”, Abu Wasim said. He is a Fatah - al-Intifada official in 
charge of security in the Shatila camp:
   “Truth is we have nothing to do with them. Some people say that Syrian intelligence was behind the group. I    
   say, why entertain such theories when the real conspiracy is so obvious: The army used Fatah al-Islam as an 
   excuse for blowing the Nahr al-Barid camp to pieces. Generals were decorated with medals for making 30.000 
   Palestinians homeless. There is a plot to destroy our camps. The Lebanese state is to blame in this matter” 188. 
With the exception of Fatah, the Palestinian factions didn't perceive Shaker al-Absi and his gang as 
an immediate threat to the community in Nahr al-Barid, and no policy was adopted to remove the 
self-imposed emir who ended up turning the camp into a war zone. Where a lack of communication 
between the LAF and the Palestinian factions had catastrophic consequences for the camp, events 
took a different turn in Ain al-Hilwe -  much owing to the response of the camp's homegrown 
Jihadists.
 
Shock waves in Ain al-Hilwe
In mid-June 2007 the ongoing conflict of Nahr al-Barid was also looming in the south. A Jihadi 
group named Jund al-Sham 189 was reportedly found fighting alongside Shaker al-Absi in the 
northern camp 190, and as a result Lebanese soldiers encircled their native base in the al-Taamir and 
al-Tawari neighborhoods bordering to Ain al-Hilwe. Tension peaked when militants started to throw 
bombs at LAF checkpoints in the area.
187 Abu Musa Sabir, leader of PFLP-GC in the Beirut area, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
188 Abu Wasim, (Fatah – al-Intifada), leader of the joint security forces in Shatila, interview with author Beirut, 
November 2013
189 Jund al-Shām – Soldiers of the Levant. 
190 In February 2007 Sunni-bloc politician and Saida native Bahia al-Hariri had in an attempt to help end an ongoing 
feud between Fatah and Jund al-Sham, payed off the latter to move out of their homes in al-Taamir / al-Tawari and 
relocate elsewhere. Many headed north and seemingly joined Fatah al-Islam instead. Because of al-Hariri's 
brokering many Lebanese news publications on the Syrian side of politics accused the al-Hariri family and the 
Sunni-bloc of being behind Shaker al-Absi's group. Others accused Syrian intelligence for manufacturing it seeing 
that al-Absi had close ties to Fatah – al-Intifada. See Knudsen, “Nahr al-Bared”, 101; Rosen, Aftermath, 204 - 205
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   This prompted Usbat al-Ansar to confront the renegade militants by forming a “security force” 191. 
According to a Palestinian official “al-Usba took this decision after the security situation in Ain al-
Hilwe was about to cross the red line and there was no time to toy with the fate of the camps of 
Lebanon (…) in light of what had happened and was still happening in Nahr al-Barid” 192. 
Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces chose another strategy than they had in Nahr al-Barid, 
this time trusting the autonomous security committee of the Islamic Forces to deal with the 
problem. Coordinating with the LAF, Ubsat al-Ansar were able to apprehend the militants, thus 
earning the status as a power broker and a partner the Lebanese state could deal with 193. According 
to the movement itself, this was the first time it had “resorted to negotiations and dialogue” with 
Lebanese state officials, calling the events “a blessing” 194. Later, Usbat al-Ansar publicly 
announced that it had dissolved Jund al-Sham and annexed some of their militants into the Islamic 
Forces of Ain al-Hilwe 195. “We were born out of the injustice inflicted on the Muslims with the 
hope of doing something fruitful”, Jund al-Sham's military leader Gandhi al-Sahmarani commented 
in an interview with NOW News: “Yet ever since our inception, others have viewed us as a ‘fault.’ 
The faults began accumulating (…) We were thus over as an organization” 196. 
      Ironically the Islamic Forces showed less tolerance for clandestine armed groups than the 
mainstream Palestinian factions had, and were able to pressure the militants into laying down their 
arms at a point where Ain al-Hilwe was about to erupt. Showing signs of a change in behavior, 
Usbat al-Ansar would soon also end their long-running feud with Fatah. As we will learn, Hamas 
was a driving force behind this reconciliation.
   The Hamas effect 
Many current members of Hamas in Lebanon were during the 80s and 90s organized in the Salafi 
organization called the Islamic League (al-rābiṭa al-islāmiyya) which was widespread in the camps 
of Lebanon 197. After striking a deal with the movement Hamas took over many of their offices upon 
officially announcing its arrival in country in 2000. Judging by surveys conducted in 2005 and 
191 Abu Sharif Aql in al Mustaqbal, “mas'ūl fī ʿusbat al-anṣār yuʿlin ḥall jund al-shām wa waḍʿa ʿanāṣirha taḥt imrat al-
qiwā al-islāmiyya [Usbat al-Ansar officials announces the dissolving of Jund al-Sham, and the placing of its 
members under the command of the Islamic Forces],” November 1. 2007: 
http://www.almustaqbal.com/v4/Article.aspx?Type=np&Articleid=239480
192  Unnamed Palestinian official cited in Saleh et. al., awḍāʿa al-lāj'īn f ī lubnān, 180
193 Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World, (Nation Books, 2010), 212
194 Al Arabiyya, “zʿaīm “ʿuṣbat al-anṣār” yataḥaddath ʿan al-ʿalāqa mʿa tanẓīm al-qāʿida.”
195 Abu Sharif Aql cited in al-Khiyam, “Awwal ḥadīth mʿa al-Naṭiq bism uṣbat al-anṣār al-islāmiyya [First talk with  
       Ubsat al-Ansar spokesperson],” July 4. 2007: http://www.khiyam.com/news/article.php?articleID=809
196  NOW Lebanon, “A call to arms: three Palestinian militant groups.”
197 Morra, al-ḥarakāt wa-l-qiwā al-'islāmiyya, 111 - 127 
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2006, refugees gave the newcomers a warm welcome: Between 20% to 30% of the camp dwellers 
said they supported Hamas 198. In May 2006, following the elections in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, they were even scoring higher in the polls than Fatah 199 200.
   As Lebanese journalist Michael Young notes, Hamas' popularity among camp dwellers is a sign 
that “Palestinian nationalism remains dominant in the camps” 201. That being said, in Gaza, Hamas 
has in recent years been grappling with a number of smaller violent groups that have challenged the 
legitimacy of the organization after it ventured into party politics. Targeted by propaganda 
campaigns and at times even physical attacks by al-Qaida-inspired networks such as Jund Ansar al-
Sham, Hamas has, according to Hovdenak , not been able to stand up against its challengers: 
Feeling a need to compensate in the face of extremist groups, officials within the movement report 
that Hamas has been pulled in a radical direction 202. Whereas Hamas in Gaza have been declared 
apostates by their opponents, Hamas in Lebanon, although not participating in elections in this 
country, has been more successful in dealing with their Jihadi Salafi challengers - at least in Ain al-
Hilwe.
   When Fatah and Usbat al-Ansar for the first time sat down to sort out their differences in 2008, it 
was Hamas who mediated between the parts. “Their conflict was tearing the camp apart” Hamas' 
leader in Lebanon Ali Barake said: “It was something obscene. We had no other choice but to go 
between the parts and make them see sense” 203. According to Barake he was able to convince the 
leadership of Usbat al-Ansar that the struggle against Israel was a Palestinian's most important form 
of jihad:
   “How can you fight each other when the al-Aqsa mosque is being raped? When our lands are being defiled by  
     the settlers? We are Palestinians and our jihad must be waged against Israel. This is what we told our brothers 
     in Usbat al-Ansar, and thank God they agreed with us”  204.
 
In an interview with anthropologist Dag Tuastad, Usbat al-Ansar leader Abu Tareq al-Saadi 
198 Mohsen Saleh and Ziad al-Hassan, The political views of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: As reflected in May  
2006, (Beirut: al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consulations, 2006), 24 - 26
199 According to author of the study Mohsen Saleh these are the last surveys conducted the political views of 
Palestinians in Lebanon, but he didn't expect the present situation to be much different (Interview with author, 
Beirut, January 2014.
200  In comparison, their allies in Islamic Jihad didn't even reach 3% on the popularity scale, although they have a far 
bigger popular following than any of the Ain al-Hilwe factions and have more members than the Islamic Forces 
combined. See Saleh and al-Hassan, The political views of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 24 - 26
201 Michael Young, “ Taking refuge in dangerous passions,” in The Wall Street Journal, June 26. 2007:  
       http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118280932217047647
202 Are Hovdenak,  Al-Qaida – a challenge for Hamas? FFI-report (2009/00092): http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/09-
00092.pdf
203 Ali Barake, interview with author Beirut, November 2013
204 Ali Barake, interview with author Beirut, November 2013
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confirms aligning with the ideas of the Hamas: “We are the same as Hamas, we are the soldiers, the 
same ideology. Ali Baraka is my twin” 205. In Fatah's narrative of the events Hamas played a smaller 
role, but officials nonetheless agreed that the days of armed confrontation with the Jihadi-Salafis in 
question were long gone: “Since 2008 we have had an agreement with Usbat al-Ansar”, a former 
employee of the Palestinian embassy said: 
   “We approached them and gave them some responsibilities. This also goes for [Jamal Khattab's] al-Haraka al- 
    Mujahida, and they are doing very well. This is the only way. The other option would have led to the  
   destruction of the camp” 206.
To what extent Usbat al-Ansar actually have followed in Hamas' ideological footsteps is hard to tell, 
but comparing older press statements to newer ones, we can nevertheless sense a certain shift in 
rhetoric. In a 1999 interview with Bernard Rougier, leader Abu Tareq al-Saadi expressed that 
“Armed action against Israel is tantamount to working for the success of Hezbollah and the Shiites,” 
claiming that such a cooperation would be impossible due to differences in religious doctrines 
(ʼaqīda) 207. 15 years later the group appears to view both cooperation with Hizballah and the 
struggle for Palestine differently. In a recent interview the movement's spokesperson Abu Sharif Aql 
informs that Usbat al-Ansar meets Hizballah regularly and that their relationship is “based on the 
principle of warding off sectarian fighting and avoiding incitements [to aggression] that only serves 
the enemies of our nation” adding that “we are keen on unifying all of our efforts in support of 
Palestine and the people of Palestine” 208.
   The movement retains its loosely defined goals of readying the world for a global caliphate as a 
primary objective, although they stress that fighting the Israeli occupation of their homeland would 
be a priority in this matter. The current Syrian battlefront is described as a distraction: “The causes 
of the Islamic Umma are many” Abu Sharif said in a speech in the fall of 2013: “Iraq today is 
hurting […], Egypt today is hurting, Syria today is hurting....but Palestine is more holy than any of 
these causes. Not only for the Palestinian people, but also for God. God has chosen us, the 
Palestinians” 209. For a movement previously having condemned nationalism as a religious sin, these 
205 Dag Tuastad “Hamas' concept of a long-term ceasefire: A viable alternative to full peace?.”  PRIO Report  
       November 2010 (Oslo: Peace research institute Oslo (PRIO) ), 28
206 Edward Kattoura, Former employee of the Palestinian embassy in Beirut, interview with author, January 2014,  
       Beirut
207 Abu Tareq al-Saadi cited in Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 57
208 Abu Sharif Aql cited in  Yasin, “ʿuṣbat al-anṣār minʿiṣāba 'ilā ʿaāmil 'istiqrār fī lubnān [Usbat al-Ansar: From an 
Armed Gang to an Agent of Stability in Lebanon]”
209 Video with unnamed publisher,“Abū sharīf ʿaql (ʿuṣbat al-anṣār al-islāmīyya) fī ʿashā' al-aʿilāmī haytham zʿaītar 
(Abu Sharif Aql (Usbat al-Ansar) at the dinner reception of the journalist Haytham Zaaitar),” 2013: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiBO9W9nau0
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were radical statements. 
   Conclusion
In Everyday Jihad Rougier claims that it is no longer possible to speak of a Palestinian society in 
Lebanon's camps: “so deep is the fracture between the PLO and its hard core (Fatah), on the one 
hand, and the Salafi militants, on the other” he writes 210. Seeing as Usbat al-Ansar, the “oldest and 
probably most important salafi-jihadi group in Lebanon” as Gade puts it 211 , has taken measures to 
mend this fracture with the PLO, it might be wise to rethink Rougier's notions.
   In this chapter we have seen Usbat al-Ansar go through stages of oscillating between 
revolutionary violence (against Lebanese clerics and judges), globalist violence (fighting in Iraq), 
and employing hostile sectarian language (anti-Shiite rhetoric), into settling as a purely globalist 
Jihadi movement. That being said, their “far enemy” of choice appears to be no different than that 
of their Islamist big brothers in Hamas, or any other Palestinian faction for that matter. As with the 
Lebanese branch of Hamas, Usbat al-Ansar has no history of fighting Israel, but the Jihadi-Salafis 
have significantly expanded their presence in their native camp. Unlike Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-
Sham, Usbat al-Ansar no longer behaves like an explosive fringe group, but has gradually become 
an integrated political force in their camp society – one that to this date have a running dialogue 
with a number of Lebanese clerics political parties 212, and the LAF.
   That being said, a change of behavior doesn't necessarily involve a change of hearts. Interestingly 
Usbat al-Ansar didn't denounce Fatah al-Islam after the events in Nahr al-Barid, but instead 
described them as their “brothers” and claimed to share with them a common understanding as they 
spoke “the language of the Quran and the Sunna” 213. In the aftermath of Nahr al-Barid Gade 
suspected the movement's newfound pragmatism was merely a change of “tactics”214. In my 
interviews with factions from both the PLO and the Alliance, similar suspicious were heard. Some 
officials were in fact unsure where the allegiance of the entire Islamic Forces laid. In the final 
chapter we will look further into these notions as we explore Palestinian views on the Islamic 
Forces during the Syrian crisis.
210 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 3
211 Gade, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon ,12
212 Ranging from the al-Hariri family, representing the March 14. alliance and the Sunni-bloc in Lebanon, to Hizballah 
and the pro-Syrian March. 8 alliance.
213  Abu Sharif Aql cited in al-Khiyam, “Awwal ḥadīth mʿa al-naṭiq bism uṣbat al-anṣār.”
214 Gade, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon ,18
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5 Confrontations during the Syrian crisis
Forming a national leadership
Although the idea had been in works for years, it was the Syrian crisis looming in the camps of 
Lebanon that more than anything helped Hamas push for the formation of a Unified Political 
Leadership for the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon (qiyāda siyāsīyya muwaḥḥada lil-faṣā'il al-
filasṭīnīyya fī lubnān). When the project went public in the fall of 2013, the factions had already for 
some time engaged in monthly meetings at the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut. In the words of 
Hamas, the formation showed that despite internal differences, the factions were able to “stay out of 
any sectarian or political strain taking place in Syria or Lebanon” 215. A PLO official noted that the 
project was giving the factions a unified voice when facing the Lebanese state; he expressed an 
annoyance with the Alliance and the Islamic Forces sending their own delegates to meet with state 
officials 216. Others were more skeptical, bemoaning that this was only one of “countless formations 
[tashkīlāt] that hardly lead to any significant change on the ground” 217. One change had, however, 
taken place: The factions al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida, Ansar al-Allah and Usbat al-Ansar, 
who's influence previously barely extended past the Follow-Up Committee and security forces of 
Ain al-Hilwe, were now taking part in national decision-making. As each of the 19 factions were 
represented by one member in the Unified Political Leadership, a fairly marginal group like Usbat 
al-Ansar found themselves having representation equal to the largest movement, Fatah. As it turned 
out, not all parts were happy with this arrangement. 
   In this chapter we will explore Palestinian motivations behind including a Jihadi-Salafi militia like 
Usbat al-Ansar in politics at a national level. Further we will see what strategies are applied to 
counter the smaller clandestine militias of Ain al-Hilwe.
Echos from Syria
While the Lebanese media was busy covering a string of suicide bombs that were hitting the 
southern suburbs of Beirut, the Palestinian factions were dealing with another aspect of the Syrian 
crisis. In December 2012 The Palestinian district of al-Yarmouk in Damascus became a scene of 
conflict between forces loyal to the Syrian president and those opposing him. Although the PLO and 
215  Abu Khalil, leader of Hamas in the Burj al-Barajne camp, interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
216  Abu Iyyad Shaalan, leader of the PLO's popular committees in Lebanon, interview with author, Beirut, January 
2014
217  Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
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the Alliance claimed to be mediating between the combatants that had entered the area through the 
southern entrance, and the Syrian forces occupying the northern entrance, rumors were that Hamas 
and PLFP-GC had joined either side of the divide and engaged in armed clashes with each other 218. 
In any event, Hamas' long-running friendship with the Syrian state had already deteriorated a year 
earlier when the movement decided to move its politburo out of the country. Being perceived to 
have sided with the anti-government rebels, Hamas lost their funding from Iran, and fell out with 
Hizballah 219. An official of the movement in Beirut even reported that the pro-Syrian factions 
wanted Hamas out of the Alliance 220. Having been able to gather the factions in a Unified Political 
Leadership in this political climate was no small achievement. That being said, the camps of 
Lebanon were still haunted by the Syrian war in every way imaginable.
   Waves of refugees fleeing from the war-stricken country weren't the only persons to arrive in Ain 
al-Hilwe 221, the camp was also witnessing the return of those who were participating in the Syrian 
war. As foreign fighters returned to their homes, relatives and friends would fire machine gun 
rounds into the air in celebration 222. While the pro-Syrian factions in the Beirut camps had 
forbidden demonstrations against the Syrian regime 223, these were commonplace in Ain al-Hilwe. 
People would typically gather around the western adjacent neighborhood al-Sekke, where several 
displaced Palestinian families from Syria lived in tents. The tent landscape was a strong symbol; it 
was chillingly reminiscent of how the camps looked the first years after al-Nakba, and for those 
opposed to the Syrian regime it served as proof that Bashar al-Asad had committed a crime not 
unlike Israel had. The factions loyal to the Baath regime of Damascus were thus being called out by 
groups of camp dwellers. At one point local Islamist agitator Bilal Badr had stormed the offices of 
al-Saiqa displaying hand grenades – allegedly he had wanted to hand their headquarters over to 
refugees from Syria 224. Furthermore, the media was reporting that cartons of Hizballah's aid 
designated for displaced Palestinians from Syria had been gathered and burned by followers of 
Shaykh Jamal Khattab's group while protesting the Shiite-Islamists' presence in the neighboring 
country 225. While the Islamic Forces had at the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut vowed to keep the 
218 “This is not a policy adapted by any of the sides”, Soheil al-Natour (DFLP), said, although he suspected it was 
possible that supporters of the two factions could have joined the fighting in al-Yamrouk. Interview with the author, 
Beirut, November 2013
219 Interview with Ali Barake, leader of Hamas in Lebanon, Beirut, November 2013
220 Interview with Abu Tafish, leader of Hamas in the Shatila camp, Beirut, October 2013
221 According to UNRWA the Saida governorate had as of November 2013 received 16,100 Palestinian refugees from 
Syria. This number doesn't include Syrian citizens also settling down in the camps. cf. UNRWA bi-weekly briefing 
November 29. 2013
222 Conversation with Ain al-Hilwe inhabitant visiting family in the Shatila camp, Beirut, October 2013
223 According to PLFP-GC leader Abu Musa Sabir it was” the people of the camps” that were adopting this policy and 
not the factions. Nonetheless the security force of Fatah al-Intifada were used to stop a sit-in in remembrance of the 
“The martyr's of al-Yarmouk” in Shatila (Field notes October 9. and 10. 2013)
224 Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
225 Al Akhbar,“Lebanon: Saida Rally to Target Hizballah,” June 4. 2013: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16005
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camp out of regional conflict lines, some of their colleagues were worried that they weren't trying 
very hard.
Palestinian perspectives on the Islamic Forces: A question of security
Was Usbat al-Ansar participating in the Syrian rebellion against Bashar al-Asad, like they had 
fought the Americans in Iraq? Leader Abu Tareq al-Saadi insisted in an interview with the Lebanese 
daily al-Akhbar that this wasn't the case this time around: “Intervention in this battle would be a 
setback to the military struggle against Israel and the US” he claimed, however “if an external 
aggression on Syria occurs, jihad will become a duty “ 226. Underlining his support for the young 
men fighting in Syria, al-Saadi was displeased with the ones that were returning to Ain al-Hilwe too 
quickly, stating that their “intent of jihad was not pure and it was merely for show and vacationing.” 
227. Whereas Hamas leader Ali Barake vouched for Usbat al-Ansar's neutrality in the Syrian 
question, stating that “our brothers in Ain al-Hilwe share our total commitment in keeping the 
camps out of any regional conflict” 228, his allies in Islamic Jihad were less optimistic:
   “ Usbat al-Ansar have a very different mindset than we do. It is very unlikely that the Islamic 
    Forces are sending people to Syria, but that doesn't mean that some of their elements haven't gone 
    independently. This is almost certain. To these I say put on an explosive belt [ḥazzim ḥālak] 
    and go to Israel, what are you doing in Syria, ya ʿammī?!” 229
Some Palestinian officials put forward that it wasn't only the mindset of the Ain al-Hilwe groups 
that set them apart from the other factions, but also their organizational structures. “Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad are are completely different from the Islamic Forces” Abu Iyyad Shaalan, the leader 
of the PLO's popular committees in Lebanon, shared:
   “They have internal conferences and elect their leaders. Usbat al-Ansar, Ansar Allah and Khattab's 
    group are not like this, they don't have bylaws or an internal system. The only two thoughts they 
    are capable of expressing are “This place is an emirate” and then “I am the emir”. We don't 
    think of them as organizations [tanẓimāt], these are groups of individuals that are collected under  
    one leader. Tomorrow when Khattab dies, that will be the end of his group. They have no future
    because they have simplistic organizational structures.” 230
226 Al Akhbar, “Ain al-Hilwe Islamists: We are not the Nusra Front,” May 4. 2013: http://english.al-
akhbar.com/content/ain-al-hilweh-islamists-we-are-not-al-nusra-front
227 Al Akhbar, “Ain al-Hilwe Islamists: We are not the Nusra Front.”
228  Ali Barake, interview with author, Beirut, November 2013
229 Abu Ashraf, Leader of Islamic Jihad in the Burj al-Barajne camp, interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
230 Abu Iyaad Shaalan, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
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Hamas' spokesperson in Lebanon, Ra'fat Morra, having written extensively on the Islamic Forces, 
expressed similar sentiments:
   “We as a movement are found in 40 states in the world, and we are therefore very different than   
   these local factions that you only have in Lebanon. [These] are very small, some would 
   say almost insignificant. They're not like the Palestinian organizations that have a profound 
   history of resistance and revolt against the occupation.” 231
Whereas Hamas perhaps viewed the Islamic Forces to lack credibility in that they were detached 
from Palestine itself, the movement's officials expressed no concern pertaining to their motives. The 
PLO's Abu Iyyad Shaalan, on the other hand, suspected that cooperation itself might be damaging to 
his organization: “Every political or religious force have their own goals and their projects which 
can make cooperation difficult”, he said:
   “Just look at Egypt. The Muslim Brothers under Morsi made an alliance with al-Sisi's demons [sic], and then  
    they were overturned and the country collapsed. As for the the Islamic Forces, they definitely have their 
    agendas, and ways of working to implement their influence, and they are probably just waiting for a convenient 
    time to overrun the others.” 232
Concidering that the Islamic Forces were described as insignificant, owing to their limited numbers 
or lack of presence in Palestine on the one hand, or suspected of having ulterior motives on the 
other, why were both Hamas and the PLO adamant in giving these a role in national decision-
making? According to the leader of the PLO's Popular Committees, the agreement was central as it 
allowed the parts to work out a plan for sharing security in Ain al-Hilwe “This rapprochement 
happened as a result of sensing the danger that surrounds the camp”, Abu Iyyad Shaalan said : 
   “Usbat al-Ansar have a certain relevance in the security apparatus of the Islamists, and we needed to find a 
   way of working together instead of against each other. There is something called 'the interest of' of the camp' 
   and this is our priority. That being said, we differ from one another in many matters,  and we might part ways at 
   a later stage.” 233
A Fatah leader in the Beirut area explained the situation in a similar way: “Cooperation is not easy 
231 Ra'fat Morra, interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
232 Abu Iyyad Shaalan, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
233 Abu Iyyad Shaalan, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
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for us, not for any of the parts to be honest, but it is necessary”, he said. “In the circumstances we 
live in, the most important thing is securing the camps. We must ensure that we speak the same 
language when it comes to security” 234.
   Having more than one base along Shāriʿa al-fawqānī, The upper street, which runs alongside the 
entire eastern side of the camp, Usbat al-Ansar had become a central security provider in Ain al-
Hilwe. In contrast to their days of glory, Fatah no longer had a stake in this area of the camp. When 
speaking to civilians, there seemed to be some confusion as to who represented the organization. 
Inhabitants still spoke of “Fatah Munir al-Maqdah” or “Fatah al-Lino” and some were even 
unaware of Subhi Abu Arab in the al-Baraksāt neighborhood, who now was in charge of the PLO's 
National Security Forces. The fact that the Islamic Forces for a long time had been running their 
own security committee was in the words of the PLO, “not ideal” 235. Forming a shared security 
committee seemed like a better prospect than being reduced to controlling only one corner of the 
camp. If this meant giving the Jihadi-Salafis a seat at the monthly meetings in the Palestinian 
embassy, it was seen as worth it. 
   
   On containing the radicals
Fatah's concern for security was not out of place. Despite having come to an agreement with the 
biggest Jihadi-Salafi militia, the movement was still locked in a feud with the clandestine groups of 
Ain al-Hilwe. Considering that Fatah through negotiations, helped by Hamas' relentless brokering, 
had been able bury the hatchet with its longest running rival, could the same approach be applied to 
smaller militias like Bilal Badr's group?
   When faced with this question Hamas was reluctant at best. “These are only individuals. They 
aren't worth our time”, spokesperson Ra'fat Morra claimed 236. “Usbat al-Ansar is one thing, Bilal 
Badr is another”, Hamas leader Ali Barake said: “People like him cannot be reasoned with. They 
don't understand the language of dialogue” 237. A former employee of the Palestinian embassy in 
Beirut suspected that Hamas was currently in no position to deal with the various clandestine 
Islamists of Ain al-Hilwe: “For the last three months, at least, Hamas has been trying to amend its 
relationship with Hizballah and Iran. Their relations with the Islamic movements have been 
disturbed, because the Islamists support the rebellion against Bashar al-Asad.”, Edward Kattoura 
234 Abu Kazim Khalil, leader of Fatah in the Beirut area, interview with the author, Beirut, November 2013
235 Abu Iyyad al-Shaalan, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
236 Ra'fat Morra, author and spokesperson for Hamas in Lebanon, interview with the author, December 2013
237 Ali Barake, leader of Hamas in Lebanon, interview with author, November 2013
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said 238. For his part, Kattoura hoped that his own movement, Fatah 239, would take the step of 
engaging in dialogue with its bitter jihadist rivals: 
   “There are two ways of dealing with what is going on in Ain al-Hilwe concerning Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham, al-
    Qaida, [the] Abdallah Azzam [Brigades], whatever you want to call this [phenomenon]: Either you confront them and 
    try to end this issue through armed confrontations, or you decide to contain them in a political way. The first option 
    will mean the end of Ain al-Hilwe as a camp. The second option is viable. It has been done before. Just look at Usbat 
    al-Ansar today” 240.
Kattoura's former colleagues in the PLO were less optimistic: “The fundamentalist movements (al-
ḥarakāt al-uṣūlīyye) we see in Ain al-Hilwe don't represent the Palestinians. Should we include al-
Nuṣra in our political body? Any dialogue with these people is a dead end”, said Abu Iyyad 
Shaalan, adding that one “had seen signs” of the Syrian branch of al-Qaida, Jabhat al-nuṣra gain a 
presence in the camp around new year's 2013 241. Speaking from his office in the Sufriyye 
neighborhood in Ain al-Hilwe, Mahmoud al-Lino Issa thought Jabhat al-nuṣra's presence to be 
limited, but expressed a concern that local Jihadist dissidents such as Bilal Badr and the al-Tamir / 
al-Tawari groups probably were trying to join forces with the network. According to the former 
commander, there had actually been attempts at establishing a dialogue with the clandestine 
militias: 
   “We do talk with some of their leaders, but in terms of negotiating, it has proven to be impossible. They are   
   solely here to implement foreign agendas and have no regard for this camp or its people. Is there any wonder we 
   always end up clashing with them?” 242. 
Although the factions reported that negotiations were tantamount to impossible, a deal was 
nevertheless struck between Fatah and Bilal Badr's group in March, 2014. Allegedly, Usbat al-
Ansar, Hamas and Islamic Jihad had overseen the process where Badr, accompanied by other Jihadi 
dissidents, signed a statement where they agreed to “denounce the recruitment of individuals from 
the Palestinian camps in Lebanon to carry out security or military operations”, adding that 
Palestinians in the "camp are united under one religion, and that killing is prohibited under God’s 
238 Edward Kattoura, former employee of the Palestinian embassy in Beirut. Interview with author, Beirut, January 
2014
239 Kattoura had been ousted from Fatah in May 2013 due to an internal controversy in the movement, where he along 
with others had confronted the faction's leadership in Lebanon. 
240 Edward Kattoura, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
241 Abu Iyyad Shaalan, interview with author, Beirut, January 2014
242 Mahmoud al-Lino Issa, interview with author's research assistant, Saida, January 2014
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law” 243. The agreement wouldn't last long. After several members of Bilal Badr's group were 
subjected to assassination attempts, resulting in the death of a young man outside his apartment in 
al-Fawqāni Street, the militants sought to settle the score with the persons they figured to have been 
behind the operations: The following May heavy clashes ensued between the armed entourage of 
Fatah official Talal al-Urduni and Badr's group (See chapter three). 
   In the aftermath of the clashes the Lebanese daily al-Nahar noted that while the PLO's National 
Security forces had been unsuccessful in stopping the violence, a large group of militants led by a 
man called Abu Tareq al-Saadi had appeared in the last stages of the shootout, finally forcing the 
gunmen on both sides to pull back 244. According to the al-Nahar journalist, locals had saluted Usbat 
al-Ansar, expressing that the inclusion of the movement in the new security committee will inhibit 
the growth of “extremist and fundamentalist groups to the likes of Bilal Badr, or the remnants of 
Jund al-Sham” 245. Ironically a group of armed Jihadi-Salafis was held to be the most effective 
firewall against extremism.
   Conclusion
In 2007 246 Bernard Rougier listed Usbat al-Ansar, al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida and the 
remnants of Basim al-Kanj's group as the main clandestine networks of Ain al-Hilwe 247. Today the 
pictures looks different. The two former movements, along with the Jihadist militia Ansar Allah, 
have reluctantly been included in the Palestinian political leadership in Lebanon. They might have 
equal representation to the largest of the Palestinian factions, but they aren't seen as equals. Being 
marginal in size, not having a presence in Palestine, and fronting ideologies, perceived  by some to 
be at odds with Palestinian neutrality in the face of the Syrian crisis, the Islamic Forces are met with 
suspicion. Nevertheless, the major factions draw a clear line between these movements and the 
present day clandestine militia networks.
243 Statement signed by Bilal Badr, Jamal Hamad, Ziad Abu Naaj, and Osama Shehabi, cited in The Daily Star, “Fatah 
to sign neutrality pact after Islamists agree to end assassinations,” March 28. 2014: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Mar-28/251507-fatah-to-sign-neutrality-pact-after-
islamists-agree-to-end-assassinations.ashx#axzz306BjuWR0
244 Jawlat al-ʻunf tawaqqaft ʻalā maḍaḍ fī ʻain al-ḥilwe raghba shʻabiyya fī taslīm zimām al-amn liʿuṣbat al-anṣār 
[Round of violence reluctantly stopped in Ain al-Hilwe. Popular desire to hand over reins of security over to Usbat 
al-Ansar],” May 14. 2014: http://newspaper.annahar.com/article/133122-  -نيع-يف-ضضم-ىلع-تفقوت-فنعلا-ةلوج  
ةبصعل-نملا-مامز-ميلست-يف-ةيبعش-ةبغر-ةولر-ةولحلا
245 Jawlat al-ʻunf tawaqqaft ʻalā maḍaḍ fī ʻain al-ḥilwe raghba shʻabiyya fī taslīm zimām al-amn liʿuṣbat al-anṣār 
[Round of violence reluctantly stopped in Ain al-Hilwe. Popular desire to hand over reins of security over to Usbat 
al-Ansar],” 
246 It should be noted that Rougier conducted his field work in the early 2000s, and mostly cover events that transpired 
      during the 90s.
247 Rougier, Everyday Jihad, (Guide to Political and Religious groups), ix
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    As much as it might be seen as an oddity in the Palestinian political landscape, Usbat al-Ansar 
has come to represent one of the most coherent military forces in Ain al-Hilwe. The PLO's wish for 
cooperation with the group was explained as a pure necessity in handling the volatile security 
situation in the camp. Paralyzed by crippling internal disputes, the PLO's leading movement, Fatah, 
seems unable to adopt a clear strategy in handling their aggressors, wavering between attempts at 
establishing a dialogue and giving away to tit for tat violence. Usbat al-Ansar and the Islamic 
Forces have, on the other hand, been able to position themselves as the most effective oppressors of 
the volatile clandestine militias of Ain al-Hilwe. This also explains their place in the Unified 
Political Leadership in Lebanon.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this study has been to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of 
Usbat al-Ansar and the Islamic Forces of Ain al-Hilwe in the framework of the Unified Political 
Leadership of the Palestinian factions in Lebanon. Initially I posed the question whether this move 
should be understood as “a result of the mainstream Palestinian factions having been able to contain 
the threat of Jihadi-Salafism and its most significant proponents” or rather “as a sign of clandestine 
extremist groups gaining ever more ground in the Palestinian community in Lebanon”.
   Whereas some Palestinian officials suggested they had been able to “contain” the Islamic Forces 
by giving them political responsibilities, a more accurate description of events would be to say that 
the movements in question have reluctantly been accepted as partners because both the PLO and the 
Alliance found themselves unable to compete with their military force. That being said, the 
inclusion of Usbat al-Ansar in the unified leadership, is not an example of  a “warlike cult of jihad” 
gaining ground 248. As much of an oddity as they are in the Palestinian political landscape, The 
Islamic forces are a different breed than the antagonistic clandestine groups we have been 
introduced to in this study. It might appear as though the role of the Islamic Forces has been largely 
overlooked by scholarly studies taking on Palestinian Islamism in Lebanon. As fluid and loosely 
defined as this organization might be, Shaykh Jamal Khattab and his constituents have as members 
of the Follow-Up Committee been a part of Ain al-Hilwe's social and political fabric since the end 
of the civil war. Despite periodically being engulfed in turmoil and surrounded by controversy, the 
movements within this system have fared notably better than the clandestine renegade militias who 
typically peter out due to lack of staying power, or end up getting obliterated through their 
revolutionary violence and armed standoffs with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The clandestine 
militias do pose a serious threat to the camp societies and their surroundings, but they should not by 
any measure be understood as a dominant social or political force.
   In Lebanon, the nationalist brand of Islamism, as fronted by Hamas, has a far more solid 
grounding in the Palestinian camps than any variety of global Jihadism. Its influence is evident 
when looking at the evolution of a movement like Usbat al-Ansar and its outspoken allegiance to its 
Islamist big brothers. Although Hamas has played a pivotal role in turning one of the most 
explosive Jihadists groups in Lebanon  into a team player, it remains to be seen if a resembling 
approach can be applied to the al-Tamir / al-Tawari militants or Bilal Badr's gathering of Muslim 
Youth. It wouldn't be surprising to see the Islamic Forces take a leading role in this type of dialogue 
248 cf. Rougier, Everyday Jihad, 2
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– they could prove to be an efficient firewall against the more extreme groups.
    Is the current pragmatism of Usbat al-Ansar merely a change of tactics? Are they holding back 
locally, in order to concentrate their violence on global targets? This is a quite possible scenario. 
Although, it should be noted that when a globalist Jihadi movement like Usbat al-Ansar, based on 
commitments of neutrality made to the Palestinian factions in Lebanon, seemingly have chosen to 
stay out of the Syrian war, a conflict that possibly has attracted more foreign fighters than any other 
conflict in history 249, we can safely say that a remarkable development has taken place. For the time 
being it seems Usbat al-Ansar, the “oldest and probably most important salafi-jihadi group in 
Lebanon 250”, has chosen local politics over global Jihad.
Closing remarks
During a visit to the Burj al-Barajne camp in the southern suburbs of Beirut a director of a local 
NGO told me: “In our camps there is religious extremism, and there is political extremism. In 
principle they are the same” 251. By political extremism he referred to the rampant factionalism that 
exists in every camp. While the inclusion of the Islamic Forces in the Unified Leadership, as I have 
argued, is not a sign of Jihadi Salafism taking over Palestinian politics, it could perhaps better 
described as a symptom of “political extremism” persisting in the camps. In Lebanon we find that 
marginal movements symptomatically take up a disproportionately big space in running the camp 
societies. As long as popular committees remain unelected, and no open political channels exist in 
the camps, the only two movements with a significant popular following, Fatah and Hamas, will 
continuously find themselves both grappling and cooperating with a number of marginal 
movements vying for power, be they pro-Syrian socialists or Jihadi-Salafis. 
249 Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria's foreign fighters,” Foreign Policy, December 9. 2013:
       http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/09/syrias_foreign_fighters
250 cf. Gade, Fatah al-islam in Lebanon
251  Hassan al-Mustafa,General director of the Youth Fraternatiy, Interview with author, Beirut, December 2013
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7 List of interviews
Ali Barake, Beirut, November 28. 2014
The leader of Hamas in Lebanon.
Ra'fat Fahd Morra, Beirut, December 12. 2013
Author and Chief communication officer for Hamas in Lebanon
Abu Khalil, Beirut, December 10. 2013
Leader of Hamas in the Burj al-Barajne camp 
Abu Tafish, Beirut, November 14. 2013
Leader of Hamas in the Shatila camp
Abu Ashraf, Beirut, December 16. 2013
Leader of Islamic Jihad in the Burj al-Barajne camp
Abu Iyyad Shaalan, Beirut, January 11. 2014
Fatah official and leader of the PLO's popular committees in Lebanon
Abu Khalil Kazim, Beirut November 3. 2013 and January 6. 2014
Fatah's leader of the Beirut region
Muahammad Dabbour and Omar Ghadban, Beirut, December 16. 
Leaders of Fatah in the Burj al-Barajne camp
Mahmoud Abu al-Abd “al-Lino” Issa, Saida, January 11. 2014
Former leader of al-Kiffah al-Musallah, the PLO's armed forces in Lebanon. 
Issa was excommunicated from Fatah in October 2013 on allegations of receiving monetary funds from 
Muhammad Dahlan, the Palestinian president's rival. Interview conducted by research assistant at 
Edward Kattoura, Beirut, September 29. 2013 and January 7. 2014
Former employee at the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut. 
Kattoura was excommunicated by Fatah after confronting the Palestinian president in a letter in May 2013. He 
considers himself a “dissident” within his movement. Interviews conducted in English.
Mahmoud Abu Jaber al-Afifi, Beirut, October 17. 2013
Interview conducted at Fatah's office in the Shatila camp, October 2013
Ziad Hammu, Beirut, October 21. 2013
PFLP official and leader of PLO's popular committee in Shatila.
Soheil al-Natour, Beirut, November 20. 2013
DFLP official, author, and human rights lawyer.
Interview conducted in English. 
Ahmad Mustafa, Beirut, December 9. 2013
DFLP official in Burj al-Barajne. 
Mustafa had just resigned from his post as the leader of PLO's popular committee in the Burj al-Barajne camp 
when I spoke to him, and had started working in an NGO dealing with displaced Palestinians from Syria.
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Abu Musa Sabir, Beirut, November 10. 2013
PFLP-GC's leader in the Beirut region
Abu Wasim, Beirut, November 9. 2013
Fatah -  al-Intifada official and leader of the joint security committee in the Shatila camp
Firas Abo Aloul, Beirut, January 9. 2014
Area Communication Officer for UNRWA in Central Lebanon.
Interview conducted in English.
Franklin Lamb, Beirut, November 2014
Journalist and volunteer for the Sabra and Shatila scholarship program
Interview conducted in English.
Mohsen Saleh, Beirut, January 11.2014
Author and general director for al-Zaytouna Centre for learning and consultations.
Mohammad Zaatari, January 10. 2004
Zaatari is a Journalist for the Daily Star based in Southern Lebanon, who has a long experience of 
covering Ain al-Hilwe. Interview conducted by phone. 
Rashid al-Mansi, Beirut, September 7. 2013
Coordinator of the youth program of the NGO The Popular Aid for Relief and Development 
(PARD). 
The organization is mainly based in Sabra and neighborhoods adjacent to Ain al-Hilwe. It works with displaced 
refugees who for various reasons don't receive help from UNRWA.
Hassan al-Mustafa, Beirut, December 9. 2013
General director of the Youth Fraternatiy, an NGO which prepares young Palestinians for career life
Employee of Beit Atfal a-Somoud in the Shatila camp in Beirut, Beirut, October 20. 2013
The employee wished to remain unnamed in this study. 
Her NGO provides education for Palestinian children in the camps of Lebanon. 
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PFLP – GC (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command)
Fatah – Al-Intifada
al-Saaiqa
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al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida (The Islamic Combatant Movement)
Usbat al-Ansar al-Islamiyya (The Islamic League of Partisans)
Ansar Allah (God's partisans)
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From north to south: 1 Nahr al-Barid, 2 Bedawi, 3 al-Jalil / Wavel, 4 Dbaye, 5 Mar Elias, 6 Shatila, 
7 Burj al-Barajne, 8 al-Miyye wa Miyye, 9 Ain al-Hilwe, 10 al-Bus, 11 Burj al-Shamali, 
12 al-Rashidiyye.
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